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The Great Lakes as a Water Resource: Questions of
Ownership and Control
INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes of North America comprise 95,000 square miles of surface water and constitute the largest single body of fresh water in the world.'
Historically, a major attraction of the Great Lakes region has been the abundant water supply which the Lakes provide.2 Great Lakes water is utilized
by industrial and municipal corporations in both the United States and Canada.
This water directly sustains the diverse activities of a population of about
36 million people.' At present, Great Lakes water is used for municipal and
industrial purposes4 exclusively at locations within the Great Lakes Basin, with
the notable exception of the Chicago Canal.'
Demand for nationwide distribution of Great Lakes water is soon expected
to become significant. 6 Those who seek wider distribution of Great Lakes

1. See INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES DIVERSIONS AND CONSUMPTIVE USES STUDY BOARD, GREAT
LAKES DIVERSIONS AND CONSUMPTIVE USES: REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMNISSION
2-I to -6 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION]. The Great Lakes
and their connecting waters occupy a drainage basin of about 297,500 square miles, of which
59% is in the United States and 41% is in Canada. The Lakes are bordered by eight states
and two provinces. Lake Superior, the uppermost and largest of the Great Lakes, discharges
through the St. Marys River into Lake Huron. Lakes Michigan and Huron are connected by
the Straits of Mackinac, and are usually treated as one Lake in hydrologic considerations. The
natural outlet for these Lakes is through the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River
into Lake Erie. Lake Erie has a natural outlet through the Niagara River into Lake Ontario.
Lake Ontario has the lowest elevation in the Great Lakes system and also has the smallest water

surface.
2. Id. at 6-46.
3. Id. at 2-30. The largely industrial economy of the Great Lakes Basin relies upon the
transportation and power advantages afforded by the Lakes, and the availability of water from
the Lakes for use by municipal corporations. See id. at 2-32.
4. In 1975, the power industry utilized 54% of the total water withdrawn from the Great
Lakes in the U.S., followed by manufacturing at 33% and municipal users at 10%. Id. at 6-46.
5. In 1822 the U.S. Congress authorized the diversion of Lake Michigan water at Chicago
and the construction of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, in an effort to promote interstate commerce on the Illinois River. See id. at 4-9 to -15 (discussing the Lake Michigan diversion at
Chicago). See also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 401-03 (1928). In 1925, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the legality of this diversion of water from the Great Lakes watershed
into the Mississippi River watershed, subject to a congressional policy of maintaining navigable
Lake levels. See Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). In Sanitary District the
Sanitary District of Chicago was enjoined from diverting water from Lake Michigan in excess
of 250,000 cubic feet per minute. Id.

6. The issue presented is whether the Great Lakes constitute a national water resource or
merely a local water resource to be used by the riparian states exclusively. See Quade, Water
Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, A.B.A. J. 1066-67 (1982). See also Hatton, The Plot to
Steal the Great Lakes, Detroit News, Nov. 28, 1982 (Magazine), at 15.
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water will do so under the assumption that the Great Lakes Basin possesses
water resources in excess of its own needs.' The demand for Great Lakes
water will be from states outside the Great Lakes Basin.' These nonriparian
states do not have legally sanctioned independent means to coerce access to
Great Lakes water for industrial, municipal or agricultural uses within their
boundaries.
Although the interests of states outside the Great Lakes Basin to use of
Great Lakes water do not constitute rights, 9 at present there are two legal
means by which those states may attain access to the water in the Lakes.
First, states outside the Basin may obtain access to use of the water by
contractual agreement with individual riparian"0 states." Second, should
7. In other words, those parties seeking water believe that the total amount of water available
from both ground and surface water sources exceeds present and projected water needs for the
municipal and industrial communities within the Great Lakes Basin. Statistics indicate that the
Great Lakes are in fact underutilized as a water resource since it is estimated that water withdrawals
from the Lakes will steadily increase between 1985 and 2035. See generally INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION, supra note I, at ch. 6 (discussing consumptive water use).
8. There will be numerous parties seeking access to Great Lakes water. Foremost among
them will be arid western states seeking to augment scarce water supplies in order to encourage
and accommodate population growth. Although the Federal Bureau of Reclamation has constructed 325 reservoirs, 345 dams, and nearly 15,000 miles of canals in western states, figures
compiled by the federal government indicate that the amount of water available in Montana
and Wyoming will be less than all the potential demands for water by the year 2000. See The
National Coal Production, Distribution, and UtilizationAct of 1980: Hearings on S. 2665 Before
the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1980) (statement of
Sen. Burdick). Also seeking access to this water will be western power companies needing additional water for electrical generating plants and coal slurry pipelines. See Quade, supra note 6,
at 1067. Also, see generally Note, Do State Restrictions on Water Use by Slurry Pipelines Violate
the Commerce Clause?, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 655 (1982). It is also highly probable that central
plains states will be seeking additional water supplies for agricultural irrigation since groundwater sources in central plains states are suffering from overdraft. The Ogallala aquifer in particular has been identified as a major source of water for agricultural use which may be in danger
of extinction. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982), where
the Supreme Court stated that "[g]round water overdraft is a national problem," id. at 3463,
and referred to the Ogallala aquifer as a "diminishing resource." Id. In addition, demand for
Great Lakes water could materialize in eastern states if present sources prove insufficient to meet
demand or in states where contamination has impaired local supplies. As noted by one author,
industries have "taken the most dangerous concoctions that their chemists have perfected and
... have used them in one or another process and then.., have taken the leftovers and routinely dumped them into rivers and aquifers .... " See F. POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES
AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE 195 (1982).
9. The interests of states outside the Great Lakes Basin are not rights, "but merely a consideration that they may address to Congress." Sanitary District, 266 U.S. at 431.
10. Strictly speaking, a "riparian" is a party owning land abutting a river and "littoral"
is the word used to describe the ownership of land contiguous to a lake. Generally, the rights
of a landowner on a navigable lake are similar to, if not identical with, those of riparian owners.

See F.

MALONEY, S. PLAOER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA

ExPERIENCE 31 (1968). Since most federal common law pertains to shared ownership and use
of interstate rivers, in order to promote consistent use of terminology "riparian" is the term
used to describe the eight states which own the shores contiguous to the Great Lakes. These
eight riparian states are Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio
and Pennsylvania.
11. State statutes in several riparian states provide for sale of water to other states. See infra
note 100.
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riparian states refuse to agree contractually to such distribution, Congress has
12
the authority to extend access rights to nonriparian states.
The governments of the eight riparian states may exhibit divergent views
as to whether such states possess the legal right to divert'3 Great Lakes water
for export to points outside the Basin. Actual disagreement between riparian
states in regard to the efficacy of water exportation has been documented
by continuous litigation.' 4 The continual threat of litigation serves to make
12. Clearly, Congress has the authority to extend such rights to states outside the Great Lakes
Basin. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1963) the Court held that the federal
government may allocate water to serve the national interest, and may supercede federal common law and state law in order to do so. See also Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3463, where the
Court expressed the view that there is a significant federal interest in both the conservation and
"fair allocation" of interstate water resources. The purpose of this Note is to inform riparian
states that they must take affirmative steps to establish a new forum in order to maintain control
over Great Lakes water use. If the riparian states react to exportation demands by enacting statutory
provisions that violate the commerce clause, the federal government may eventually intervene
and allocate the water in accordance with a contemporary beneficial use standard, irrespective
of the consent of the riparian states. See Clyde, State Prohibitionson the Interstate Exportation
of Scarce Water Resources, 53 U. CoLo. L. REV. 529, 531 (1982). One may only speculate as
to what sort of future consensus might coalesce in Congress. Congressional intervention to distribute
eastern water to western states could conceivably cause an East-West "civil war" over usufructuary rights, or at least create serious regional tensions. Riparian states in eastern jurisdictions,
jealously asserting control over local water resources might somehow refuse to yield to a federal
allocative system which would, in effect, take "their" water and "give" it to non-riparian states,
free of charge. See infra note 214.
The Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), is a
cogent example of the exercise of the federal prerogative in this area. The Act vests authority
in the Department of the Interior to augment and allocate the water supply of the Colorado
River Basin throughout and beyond the basin. The Act incorporates provisions to authorize the
importation of water into the Colorado River Basin from "any other natural river drainage basin
lying outside the [Colorado River Basin]." Id. § 1511. Furthermore, if the Secretary of the Interior should plan to import water from other basins, "he shall make provision for adequate
and equitable protection of the interests of the states and areas of origin ....
" Id. § 1513.
13. To divert means to remove water from its natural channel and to transport it through
pipes, conduits, ditches or canals. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1505 (McKinney 1973
& Supp. 1983-1984). There are five existing diversions in the Great Lakes Basin. Four of these
diversions involve a transfer of water from the watershed of one Great Lake into that of another.
These diversions are the Long Lac and Ogoki Diversions from the Hudson Bay drainage basin
into Lake Superior, the Welland Diversion from Lake Erie into Lake Ontario and the diversion
from the Niagara River into the New York State Barge Canal. The Chicago Canal diverts water
from Lake Michigan into the Mississippi River watershed. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 4-1.
14. In fact, there has been long-standing disagreement between riparian states on the issue
of diversion of Great Lakes water to points outside the Great Lakes watershed. The Supreme
Court has mediated a dispute between Wisconsin (and intervening states) and Illinois in a series
of cases; Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), 281 U.S. 179, 696 (1930), 289 U.S. 395
(1933), 388 U.S. 426 (1967), 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
In 1922, the State of Wisconsin successfully sought an injunction to bar the State
of Illinois from diverting Lake Michigan water. However, in 1925, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned the injunction and diversion was allowed... at an average rate
of 8,500 cfs [cubic feet per second] . . . . Other decrees were issued by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1930 and 1967 and again amended in 1980.
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 4-10. The 1930 decree reduced allowable
diversion to, in effect, 3,100 cfs. The 1967 decree raised the maximum allowable diversion to
3,200 cfs, and the 1980 decree affirmed the limit, but modified the method of accounting for
the amount of water withdrawn. Id.
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water exportation impracticable for riparian states which choose to export
water. A Senate bill and two House bills, introduced in the first session of
the Ninety-Eighth Congress, directly address this issue. Each bill seeks to prohibit diversions of Great Lakes water for use outside a Great Lakes state unless
such action is approved by all the Great Lakes states. The introduction of
these bills makes it apparent that at least some government officials in Great
Lakes states consider the possibility of nationwide distribution of Great Lakes
water to be an imminent threat and a serious affront to the interests of some
or all of those states.15

Despite the efforts of the litigant states and the attempts of the Supreme Court to mediate
the matter, this protracted litigation has not promoted the achievement of a consensus or solution in regard to the riparian states' shared use of Great Lakes water. The controversy remains
even today as states seek to incrdase diversions of water. For example, according to the Supreme
Court decree in 1967 the State of Illinois
may make application for a modification of this decree so as to permit the diversion of additional water from Lake Michigan for domestic use when and if it appears that the reasonable needs of the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Region
•.. for water ... cannot be met from the water resources available to the region,
including both ground and surface water and the water permitted by the decree
• . . and if it further appears that all feasible means reasonably available to the
State of Illinois . . . have been employed . . . to conserve and manage the water
resources of the region and the use of water therein in accordance with the best
modern scientific knowledge and engineering practice.
388 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1967).
15. Senate Bill S. 2026, the Great Lakes Water Diversion Act, would "prohibit diversions
of Great Lakes water, except as approved by all the Great Lakes states and the International
Joint Commission, for use outside of a Great Lakes state and to prohibit federally sponsored
studies involving the feasibility of diverting Great Lakes water." S. 2026, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). The Bill further states in part,
[t]he Congress finds and declares that (1) the Great Lakes are a most important
natural resource to the eight Great Lakes States and two Canadian provinces, providing water supply for domestic and industrial use, clean energy through hydropower
production, an efficient transportation mode for moving products into and out
of the Great Lakes region, and recreational uses for millions of United States and
Canadian citizens; (2) the Great Lakes need to be carefully managed and protected
to meet current and future needs within the Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces; (3) any new diversions of Great Lakes water for use outside of a Great
Lakes State will have significant economic and environmental impact, adversely
affecting the use of this resource by the Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces
• . . [and declares that the purpose and policy of the Act is to] take immediate
action to protect the limited quantity of water available from the Great Lakes system
for use by the Great Lakes states and in accordance with the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 . ...
Id. House Bill H.R. 4366, the Great Lakes Water Preservation Act would also "prohibit diversions of Great Lakes water, except as approved by all the Great Lakes States and the International Joint Commission, for use outside of a Great Lakes State and . . . prohibit federally
sponsored studies involving the feasibility of diverting Great Lakes water." H.R. 4366, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The text of this Bill is nearly identical to that of S. 2026. House Bill
H.R. 4545, the Great Lakes Protection Act, would "require the approval of each of the Great
Lakes States for any diversion of water from the Great Lakes or the Great Lakes drainage basin
for use outside of the Great Lakes States and to prohibit Federal studies of the feasibility of
any such diversion." H.R. 4545, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The text of the Bill further states that
[n]o Great Lakes State shall sell or otherwise transfer or permit the sale or transfer,
for use outside of such State, water which is taken from any of the Great Lakes
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This Note will identify the doctrinal and administrative changes which are6
required to surmount proposed and existing legal impedifients to exportation.'
The impetus for this endeavor derives from the author's perception that law
and public policy in the Great Lakes region have responded positively to the

demands of an expanding constituency of Great Lakes water users within the
Great Lakes Basin over the past one hundred years. The author surmises that
this trend will continue to expand and will eventually encompass transcon-

tinental water transfers.
The policy of granting Great Lakes usufructuary rights to a growing constituency of water users has manifested in four fundamental stages. Originally,
state authority over water resources in Great Lakes jurisdictions was governed
by the common law doctrine of riparianism. At this stage, courts were the
exclusive forum for the resolution of disputes between private riparian parties. Common lav decisions subsequently evolved to reflect increased rejection of the riparian doctrine and a growing incorporation of elements of the
prior appropriation doctrine; this allowed nonriparian parties access to water.
At this stage, municipal corporations assumed primary allocative control over
state water resources.'" In a relatively recent development, state control over
appropriation and distribution of water resources was augmented by the
establishment of state permit systems which incorporate features of the riparian
and prior appropriation doctrines. As a result, state governments exert primary

control over the distribution of state water resources by means of decisionmaking authority vested in the permit system,' 8 and courts have assumed a
more limited role as a forum for the adjudication of usufructuary rights. In
the stage which is presently emerging, control of Great Lakes water use will
be increasingly assumed by riparian state governments in the form of
cooperative control.
This Note proposes that the law should 9 accommodate demands for exor any other body of surface or ground water which is located within the Great
Lakes drainage basin unless (1) there is in effect an interstate compact among the
Great Lakes States which governs such sale or transfer, or (2) each of the Great
Lakes States consents to such sale or transfer.
Id.
16. The author acknowledges that water law is an area of jurisprudence which is greatly
influenced by overt political processes of dispute resolution. For example, Congress may exert
great influence in determining the response of law and public policy to demands for exportation
of Great Lakes water to states outside the natural contours of the Great Lakes Basin. However,
it is nonetheless true that parties-whether private or state-may gain or deny access to water
in a given waterbody only by relying on principles of water law successfully asserted in the proper legal forum.
17. "All of the centralized water distribution systems throughout the Great Lakes Basin...
are included within the municipal water use sector." INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 6-5. This includes residential, commercial, institutional and public uses. Id.
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984). "It shall be unlawful
for the state, any person ... or other political subdivision of the state to appropriate or use
any waters of the state, surface or underground, without the written permit of the commissioner .

. . ."

Id. § 105.41(l) (West Supp. 1984).

19. The analysis applied in this Note leads to the conclusion that law and public policy should
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portation of Great Lakes water to states outside of the Great Lakes Basin.
Such a development would be a logical extension of the growth pattern outlined
above. However, this Note argues that increased exportation of large quantities of Great Lakes water beyond the natural contours of the Great Lakes
Basin will not be practicable 0 unless authority over Great Lakes water allocations is vested in an interstate administrative forum. The author advocates
the adoption of a consensual forum which would decrease the use of litigation to resolve usufructuary disputes. To promote the optimal utilization of
Great Lakes water for the benefit of the public, the author also advocates
the adoption of a contemporary beneficial use standard for water allocation.
This Note will proceed to outline the features which would be basic to the
structure of a proposed interstate administrative agency.
DETERMINANTS OF GREAT LAKES WATER OWNERSHIP
The concept of Great Lakes water ownership includes two separate, yet
related, realms: ownership of the Great Lakes as a waterbody in a territorial
sense' and ownership of the Great Lakes water in a usufructuary2 2 sense.
Both aspects of ownership connote a relationship between a sovereign entity
and the Great Lakes as a waterbody; in contrast to ownership of the waterbody itself, a usufructuary right signifies possession of the equitable right
to diversion and use of the water in that waterbody. While this Note will
examine usufructuary rights most closely, it is nonetheless necessary to outline
the territorial dimensions of the Lakes, as they give rise to the determination
of usufructuary rights.
Usufructuary rights in Great Lakes water are derived from a hierarchical
structure of sovereign entities and their attendant forums. While water law
is fundamentally within the province of state law,23 superimposed upon Great
Lakes usufructuary rights are the legal obligations and constraints imposed
by state agreement in the form of interstate compacts, federal regulation under
the commerce clause and international treaty.
be moving in the direction of obligating riparian states to accommodate the reasonable needs
of nonriparian states seeking use of Great Lakes water.
20. This is because riparianism generates excessive litigation.
21. Territorial ownership of the Great Lakes refers to the rights of the United States and
Canada to control the Lakes to the extent that they fall within respective national boundaries,
and the rights of riparian states to control the navigable waters within respective state boundaries.
22. Usufructuary signifies ownership of the right to use of property, in contrast to ownership
of the property itself.
23. A state provides for the welfare of its inhabitants by allocating water under its police
power authority. See Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 21, 218 N.W.2d 734, 743 (1974). The
exercise of police power for general welfare is reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.
"The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," U.S. CONT. amend. X.
The police power is a matter of state legislative prerogative; in this field the legislature has wide
discretionary powers in regard to "everything essential to public safety, health and morals."
Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202, 1203 (10th Cir. 1971). See also infra note 26.
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TERRITORIAL CONCEPTS OF OWNERSHIP: SOVEREIGNS AND THEIR
FORUMS

State

The Great Lakes are contiguous to eight of the United States.2 4 The beds
of the Great Lakes are owned by the contiguous states extending from the
shoreline to the point of the international boundary.2" The United States
Supreme Court has established that states own the waters of navigable waterbodies within state boundaries.26 Since each state riparian to the Great Lakes
owns that portion of the Lakes within its boundaries, 7 state law in Great
Lakes jurisdictions establish primary control over diversions from the Lakes. "8
The Great Lakes states ratified the Great Lakes Basin Compact in 1955 in
29
order to promote comity in regard to the sharing of the interstate waterbody.
The Compact established the Great Lakes Commission to "promote the
orderly, integrated and comprehensive development, use and conservation of
the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin.""0
Federal

Federal control of the Great Lakes has been founded upon a navigability
interest and not a usufructuary interest in the water of the Lakes.' The Great
24. These states are Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania.
25. See D.C. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 19 (1967). The principle
of state ownership of lake beds is promulgated in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1301-43 (1976). Id. at n.3.
26. In Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842), the Supreme Court
held that "the people of each state . . .hold the absolute right for all their navigable waters
and the soils under them for their own common use ...." This principle, applicable to the
thirteen original states, was extended to new states in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845). Recently, the Supreme Court has noted that throughout the "history of the relationship
between the Federal Government and the States . . .runs the consistent thread of purposeful
and continued deference to state water law by Congress." California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645, 653 (1978).
27. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S.
367 (1929). See also PIPER, supra note 25, at 19.
28. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 123.03 (1978); Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 30.21(1) (West 1973 &
Supp. 1983).
29. Great Lakes Basin Compact, ratified by the State of Illinois, July 13, 1955, 1955 ILL.
LAWS 1678 § 1-4. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, 192.1 (Smith-Hurd 1981) The United States
Congress consented to the compact in 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
30. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art I. Id. The Great Lakes states also ratified the Great
Lakes River Basin Commission, pursuant to its establishment by the executive order of the President under title II of Pub. L. No. 89-90 [42 U.S.C. §§ 1962b-62c], the Water Resources Planning
Act. The Commission was abolished by executive order in 1981. Exec. Order No. 12,319, 46
Fed. Reg. 45,591 (1981). This order was widely regarded as a retrograde action, especially since
the Great Lakes Commission has taken a narrow view of its functions. See infra note 175.
31. Although the federal interest is primarily that of protecting the navigability of the Lakes,
the federal government may also have a proprietary interest in Great Lakes usufructuary rights,
i.e., in the allocation of water resources. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S.Ct.
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Lakes constitute an interstate body of navigable water32 and areas of the Lakes

which are within its territorial jurisdiction are subject to control by the United
States government under its commerce clause authority."s In Sanitary District
v. United States,34 the Supreme Court held that a riparian state cannot
authorize diversions of water from the Great Lakes that will affect Lake levels,
without the consent of Congress,35 since withdrawals that affect Lake levels36
may also impair navigation."
International

The Great Lakes and the connecting St. Lawrence Seaway form a common
boundary between the United States and Canada. 38 Although the waters are
comingled, the United States and Canada own those areas of the Great Lakes

within their respective national boundaries.

9

Therefore, the Lakes are na-

3456, 3457 (1982), where the Supreme Court stated, in reference to the interstate Ogallala Aquifer,
that "there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of this
diminishing [water] resource."
32. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). "The waters of the [L]akes
are public navigable waters because they are navigable in fact and provide a continuous ...
highway for commerce." PIPER, supra note 25, at 20.
33. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress shall have the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations and among the several States .... " Id. Commerce clause authority extends
to water navigable in interstate or foreign commerce. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,
566 (1870).
34. 266 U.S. 405 (1924).
35. Id. at 426. "The main ground is the Authority of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate and foreign commerce. There is no question that this power is superior to
that of the states to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants." Id. State police
power regulations are subject to federal regulations which protect navigation interests. See PIPER,
supra note 25, at 20.
36. It is possible that increased withdrawals from the Lakes may not significantly affect Lake
levels since modern engineering techniques may be used to upgrade the hydrologic bounty of
a waterbody. The Great Lakes have a history of such manipulation by the Army Corps of Engineers.
Lakes have been dredged to protect harbor lines and artificial channels have been constructed
to augment Lake levels. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3-7. It has been
suggested that water levels may be controlled by the use of underground weirs. Lake Superior
and Ontario levels are already controlled by this method. In the future, Great Lakes water levels
may also be augmented by greater use of inflow into the Great Lakes from sources outside the
Great Lakes Basin, which flow elsewhere and are wasted, at least in terms of human usufructuary purposes. See Meserow, Great Lakes Water-Is There Enough?, 47 CHI. B. REC. 60, 63-64
(1965). Inflows into the Great Lakes Basin can also be augmented by increased diversion of
floodwaters into the Basin, capture and diversion of precipitation and even use of icebergs for
additional water potential. (Seventy percent of the world's fresh water is frozen.)
37. See Hatton, supra note 6, at 15.
38. The present international boundary originated in the Treaty of Ghent (1814). The Commissioners stipulated that the pertinent northern boundary of the United States would be the
"middle" of Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron and Superior, and their connecting waters. Britain
(on behalf of Canada) and the United States ratified a treaty to establish a modern, accurate
boundary line, which was officially delineated in 1913. It does not correspond to the exact center
of each body of water but consists of 270 straight lines which are the equivalent of a median
line. See PIPER, supra note 25, at 8-17.
39. See id. at 18.
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tional, not international, waters."0 While each nation exercises complete
jurisdiction over all territorial waters within its boundaries, any institutional
arrangement for diversion and use of water withdrawn from those areas of
4
the Great Lakes within United States territory must recognize Canadian rights. '

The United States and Canada ratified the Boundary Waters Treaty

2

in

1909 to regulate the shared use of Great Lakes water and to resolve all disputes

arising along the common frontier. The treaty promulgates the principles that
govern the boundary waters43 and created the International Joint Commis44
sion to preside over matters involving the diversion or use of the waters.
The International Joint Commission is a bilateral commission which promulgates procedures for the adjudication of usufructuary conflicts. 4

40. Id.
41. This Note will not attempt to address fully the issue of Canadian rights since such a
topic would in itself constitute an extensive research project. This in no way implies that Canadian rights are of small significance in policy considerations regarding United States usufructuary rights in Great Lakes water. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
42. Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain (for Canada), 36
Stat. 2448.
43. For the purposes of the treaty, boundary waters are defined as those Lakes, or connecting
waters or portions thereof, through which the international boundary passes; tributary waters
are those which flow into or from the Lakes or their connecting waters. PIPER, supra note 25,
at 74. "The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of all navigable boundary waters
shall forever continue free and open for the purposes of commerce to the inhabitants . . . of
both countries equally . . . ." Boundary Waters Treaty, art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2449.
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial governments on the other
as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto,
the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary
or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed that
any interference with or diversion from their natural channels of such waters on
either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same
legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion
or interference occurs ....
Id. at art. II.
44. Article III of the Boundary Waters Treaty establishes that
[i]t is agreed that . . . no further uses . . . or diversions, whether temporary or
permanent, of boundary waters on either side of the line, affecting the natural
level or flow of boundary waters on either side of the line, shall be made except
by authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada within their respective jurisdictions and with the approval, as hereinafter provided, of a joint commission, to be known as the International Joint Commission.
Id. at art. III. The treaty provides that such provisions are not intended to interfere with the
ordinary use of such waters for domestic and sanitary purposes. Id.
45. Under international law, the United States and Canada, respectively, have complete jurisdiction over Great Lakes tributary waters since those waters lie wholly within each nation's respective boundaries. These unilateral rights accrue to each nation so long as neither nation's actions
in regard to its use of water directly injures the other nation. In contrast, the principles which
govern the use of boundary waters are derived from the perceived need for more immediate
bilateral cooperation. See PIPER, supra note 25, at 75.
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No party, private or state, may "own" water in an absolute sense. 4 ' The
United States Supreme Court has expressed the view that water is not amenable
to private ownership as long as the water remains part of a waterbody.47 Water
as an article of property may not be owned in any true sense until it has been
4
appropriated. 8
9
Water "ownership" consists of a "bundle of usufructuary rights,"'4
5
grounded in equitable principles. " The usufructuary character of water ownership reflects the natural physical properties of water and the fact that water,
as a physical entity, is continually moving through a dynamic process known
as the hydrologic cycle." Although science has established that all forms of
water comprise one interconnected hydrologic entity, 2 law generally assigns
each waterbody a53 particular legal status according to its location in the
hydrologic cycle.

The law distinguishes between usufructuary rights in navigable and non46. This is also true of land ownership since fee simple title confers only an estate in land.
This reflects the fact that land "ownership" merely confers upon the title holder superior rights
to use of land. See generally Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use-The Need for
a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 759, 760 (1974).
47. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876).
48. State courts have espoused the view that running water is incapable of ownership, and
neither the state nor riparian owners have any title in it until it is appropriated. Sweet v. City
of Syracuse, 129 N.Y. 316, 335, 27 N.E. 1081, 1084 (1891); City of Syracuse v.. Stacey, 169 N.Y.
231, 245, 62 N.E. 354, 355 (1901). The elusive character of water "ownership" was discussed in
Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas. Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889), where the
court described water as a "mineral ferae natural" which belongs to the owner of the land to
which the waterbody is contiguous. These rights are derived from the natural relationship between the land and the waterbody. However, when the water is severed from the land and comes
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
49. An individual's rights in water are known as usufructuary rights, not property rights.
Since the phrase "bundle of rights" is a term of the art in property law, "bundle of usufructuary
rights" may be considered a term of the art in water law. See generally Stacey, 169 N.Y. at
233, 62 N.E. at 356. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 II1. 492, 494 (1842).
50. Equitable distribution of available water resources is an important consideration in all
aspects of water law since water is a necessary component of human survival and of nearly all
human enterprise, e.g., industry or agriculture. Therefore, the conflicting usufructuary needs
of parties give rise to a judicially imposed balancing of rights. For example, the rights of a
riparian owner to the use of water are relative to the rights of other riparian owners on the
same waterbody. See generally State v. Zawistowski, 95 Wis. 2d 250, 262, 290 N.W.2d 303,
309 (1980).
51. "Scientists have long recognized that water moves in what is known as the hydrologic
cycle, the recurring period through which water passes from atmospheric water vapor into liquid
and solid form as precipitation, then along or into the ground, finally returning to atmospheric
water vapor by evaporation and transpiration." F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, supra
note 10, at 141.
52. Id. at 2.
53. For example, state statutes typically distinguish between usufructuary rights in groundwater and surface water. See id. at 141-42. In other words, the law distinguishes usufructuary
rights on the basis of where water is located in the hydrologic cycle when it is diverted for human
use.
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navigable waterbodies. Private landowners generally take title to nonnavigable
lakes, ponds and streams that exist on their land.54 Navigable waterbodies
are not amenable to such private ownership. A private landowner whose land
abuts a navigable waterbody will generally have limited usufructuary rights:
the right to divert water for reasonable uses, 55 and the right of egress to
6
navigable channels of the waterbody.
The state holds title to navigable waters in a public trust capacity for the
benefit of state inhabitants, the beneficiaries of the trust. 17 The state has legal
standing to protect the water within its territory, irrespective of the assent
or dissent of the private owners immediately concerned. 8 Government ownership of water is actually a legal fiction which supports the state's regulatory
powers, 59 "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
' 60
an important resource.
The United States Supreme Court, in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,61
examined the concept of state water "ownership" in the context of state control over the allocation of intrastate water resources. 62 The Court reaffirmed
the opinion that state ownership of water is a legal fiction, 63 confirming the
demise of the theory of state ownership of water resources that had once
64

prevailed.

54. See id. at 35.
55. These are riparian rights. See infra note 69. See generally State ex rel. Chain O'Lakes
Protective Ass'n v. Moses, 53 Wis. 2d 579, 193 N.W.2d 708 (1972).
56. The right to build a dock for boat launching is a riparian right.
57. For elucidation of the public trust authority concept, see Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842). See also McCready, 94 U.S. at 394.
58. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (quoting Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902)).
59. See generally Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAUrF. L.
REv. 638, 648, 653 (1957).
60. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
61. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
62. In Sporhase, the appellants owned adjacent tracts of land located in Nebraska and Colorado. A well located on the Nebraska tract pumped groundwater for use irrigating crops on
both the Nebraska tract and the Colorado tract. The State of Nebraska brought an action to
enjoin the appellants from transporting Nebraska groundwater into Colorado without a permit.
The permit system contained a provision conditioning transfer of Nebraska groundwater across
state lines on the receiving state granting reciprocal rights. See id. at 3458.
63. Id. at 3462.
64. In 1908, in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), the United
States Supreme Court nearly suggested that a state is the absolute proprietary owner of its water
resources. The Court upheld a New Jersey statute which prohibited the transfer of state waters
to out-of-state locations. The Court stated that "a State has a constitutional power to insist
that its natural advantages remain unimpaired by its citizens . . . [and] . . . [i]n the exercise

of this power it may prohibit the diversion of the water of its important streams to points outside
of its boundaries." 209 U.S. at 349. This ruling authorized a state to statutorily withhold its
water resources from interstate commerce under the theory of absolute ownership by the state.
Hudson County relied on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30, 534 (1895), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut statute banning interstate transportation of game birds.
As noted by the Court in 1982, "Geer ... was premised on the theory that the state owned
its wild animals and therefore was free to qualify any ownership interest it might recognize in
the persons who capture them." Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 3461. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
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The fiction of water ownership is manifested by the exercise of legally sanc-

tioned usufructuary rights. These rights originate in the valuable65 right of
a party, state or private, to withdraw'6 water from a waterbody. The right
to withdraw water from a waterbody is accompanied by the right to reasonable
use 67 or beneficial use 61 of the water which has been diverted. These basic
features of usufructuary rights have been formulated under the aegis of two
common law doctrines, the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines.
The riparian doctrine, developed in states with plentiful water supplies, provides a usufructuary right to a landowner owning a tract of land contiguous
to the waterbody itself. 69 Each riparian proprietor has the right to the
reasonable use"0 of whatever water he can divert onto his land and, under
the reasonable use rule, he may use the water for any purpose as long as
such use does not interfere with the legitimate uses of other riparian owners.
Since the usufructuary right is appurtenant to the riparian land itself, under
the riparian doctrine, water use is restricted to riparian land and, under a
strict interpretation of the reasonable use doctrine, even a riparian party may
not divert any of his share of water for use on nonriparian land. 7' He may
not sell his share of water, or any portion of it, to a nonriparian user. Use
322 (1979), the Supreme Court overruled Geer and signaled the demise of the state ownership
theory. Id. Other courts had earlier disagreed with the line of reasoning which formed the basis
for the Hudson County ruling. For example, in City of Altus, Okla. v. Carr, 255 F. Supp.
828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'dper curiam 385 U.S. 35 (1966), the theory of state ownership of
water was rejected by the federal district court. The State of Texas had argued that it owned
all groundwater within the state and that when a private landowner withdrew water from the
ground the state retained a residuum of ownership and could thereby limit use of the water
to within the state. The federal district court, in rejecting this contention, was influenced by
the fact that water which is withdrawn from a well becomes the personal property of the landowner, 255 F. Supp. at 839. Therefore the court found that the state ceases to own groundwater
after it is extracted from the ground.
65. The right to withdraw water from a waterbody is a valuable right in itself. This right
must be bargained for separately from any ownership rights in the land which is contiguous
2d 130, 395 N.E.2d
to the waterbody. See Village of Riverwoods v. Department of Transp., 77 I11.
555 (1979).
66. In a water-use context, this is usually called a "diversion" of water.
67. The reasonable use standard is used in riparian jurisdictions. See infra note 70.
68. Beneficial use means the application of water to a useful purpose which inures to the
benefit of the water user. See IowA CODE § 455 B.261 (1983). The beneficial use concept originated
in the prior appopriation doctrine but has been adopted by permit systems in riparian jurisdictions.
492 (1842). See Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S.Ct.
69. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill.
539, 540 (1982) for a definition of the riparian doctrine under federal common law.
70. See People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902), for a discussion of the
reasonable use rule as a means of determining rights between riparian owners. The reasonable
use standard allows a court great discretion.
[t]n determining whether a use is reasonable we must consider what the use is for,
its extent, duration, necessity, and its application; the nature and size of the stream,
and the several uses to which it is put; the extent of the injury to the one proprietor
and of the benefit to the other; and all other facts which may bear upon the
reasonableness of the use.
Id. at 217. See generally Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wis.
L. REv. 864.

71. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 111. 492 (1842); People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W.
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of water on nonriparian land is per se unreasonable use. Consequently, if
there is more water available in a waterbody than is needed for use on riparian
land the "surplus" water simply remains untapped, at least for human usufructuary purposes."'
An alternative method of allocating water is formulated under the doctrine
of prior appropriation. This doctrine developed in arid western states where
parties compete for scarce water supplies. It provides water on a "first in
time, first in right" basis. Any party which claims a beneficial use 3 for water
may divert available water, and may transport it to the location of his use,
which need not be on riparian land. The appropriator may claim and divert
any amount of water not claimed for beneficial use by prior appropriators.
An earlier claimant has seniority rights over subsequent claimants.7 ' Under
the prior appropriatiorf doctrine, usufructuary rights are derived from the
beneficial use of water rather than from ownership of land contiguous to the
waterbody.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW
USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS IN GREAT LAKES JURISDICTIONS
Great Lakes states originally subscribed to the common law doctrine of
riparianism. Common law decisions in riparian jurisdictions evolved, however,

to reflect a rejection of the strict application of the riparian doctrine and a
growing incorporation of elements of the prior appropriation doctrine."5 An
early sign of the demise of the riparian doctrine appeared when the common
law in several riparian jurisdictions expressly conferred riparian rights upon
municipal corporations.' This common law modification was essential to the
growth of cities and industries within the Great Lakes Basin, although it
allowed nonriparian landowners the same usufructuary rights as were possessed
by riparians. 7 7 All inhabitants of a town were thereby entitled to use water
from any waterbody to which the town was riparian.
211 (1902). See also Farnham, The Permissible Extent of Riparian Land, 7

LAND

& WATER

L. REv. 31 (1972).

72. Using this analysis, much of the water in waterbodies in riparian jurisdictions is going
to waste. See generally F. MALoNEY, S. PLAOER & F. BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 191 (1968).
73. For a definition of beneficial use, see supra note 68.
74. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). See Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539, 540 (1982), for an outline of the features of prior appropriation under federal common law.
75. See Omernick v. Department of Natural Resources, 71 Wis. 2d 370, 374, 238 N.W.2d
114, 116, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976).
76. These decisions were a significant departure from precedent since originally only a private
party owning land contiguous to a waterbody could exercise riparian rights. Inhabitants of a
town located on a lake or river were not riparian parties unless they enjoyed private access to
the waterbody. See City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902); Minnesota
Mill Co. v. Board of Water Comm'r of St. Paul, 56 Minn. 485, 58 N.W. 33 (1894); City of
Elgin v. Elgin Hydraulic Co., 85 II1. App. 182 (1899).
77. The legal basis for the extension of these rights was the equitable cognizance of the need
for water by industrial users and by state inhabitants who were increasingly concentrated in cities.
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This change in the law reflected the fact that the riparian doctrine had
become an archaic and unworkable doctrine under emerging socio-economic
conditions. The riparian doctrine was rejected for two primary reasons. First,
the doctrine allows no provision for the needs of nonriparian parties to the
use of water in a waterbody, 8 and thereby excludes much of the public from
attaining valuable usufructuary rights. Second, the doctrine precludes recognition that better uses of water, by some criteria, may exist by either other
riparians or nonriparians" and thereby fails to promote the most beneficial
use of water. 80
The riparian doctrine has serious administrative limitations as well. It fosters
uncertainty of usufructuary rights because "reasonable use" of water by a
riparian party is determined in relation to the needs of other riparian parties8 '
and reasonable use can only be determined by litigation. Litigation is not an
effective means for resolving the claims of a multitude of parties to usufructuary rights in a single waterbody. First, the outcome of litigation is only
binding upon the rights of parties to the litigation.82 Second, because water
needs constantly change with socio-economic circumstances and because the
availability of surplus water in a waterbody changes in accordance with fluctuating water levels, the reasonable use standard provides variable results.
Therefore, the method of continual litigation to determine reasonable use has
been criticized for failing to provide secure, quantifiable usufructuary rights.83
The failure of the riparian doctrine to meet contemporary socio-economic
needs has resulted in the incorporation of prior appropriation concepts into
the common law of Great Lakes jurisdictions.8" In order to remedy the doctrinal and administrative limitations inherent in common law riparianism, some
riparian states enacted statutes which established permit systems to allocate
state water resources. These statutory permit systems, in effect, enunciate
"hybrid" state water law doctrines which incorporate features of the riparian
and prior appropriation doctrines.85 Usufructuary rights are determined by
a centralized state agency rather than through litigation, thus promoting greater
certainty of usufructuary rights. 6 Water users receive an entitlement to water
78. Of course, such a policy is entirely consistent with the riparian doctrine. Its purpose is
to narrowly circumscribe usufructuary rights, and to give exclusive privileges to riparian parties.
Historically, nonriparians were forced to rely on groundwater to satisfy their water needs.
79. See F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDwIN, supra note 10, at 172.
80. The concern for promoting beneficial use of water is the crux of the prior appropriation
doctrine.
81. See supra notes 69 & 70. See also Laurie v. Silsby, 207 Pa. 459, 56 A. 1005 (1904).
82. Only those parties would be within the purview of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
83. See supra note 14.
84. This intrastate development reflects upon commerce clause issues that are discussed
throughout this Note.
85. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.37-.81 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §

30.18 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983).
86. Certainty is conferred by a permit which specifies that the holder is entitled to a specified
quantity of water for a certain use, and which designates any conditions which qualify or abrogate
the rights of the permit holder.
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in accordance with beneficial use priorities established by the agency, 7 rather
than by employment of a reasonable use standard by a court.
State administrative agencies have emerged as the contemporary forum for
the adjudication of usufructuary rights. Permit systems govern the acquisition and sale of water by public and private waterworks systems and regulate
the sale of water by municipal corporations. The increasing prevalence of state
permit systems in riparian jurisdictions signifies the culmination of the evolution from private riparian rights to state-controlled public water rights. 8 State
permit systems represent an unprecedented assertion of state authority over
water resources within a state. 9 The state derives this authority from its status
as public trustee and allocates water under its police power authority. 0 The
state may regulate the allocation and use of state water resources so that water
will be available for all reasonable domestic, agricultural and industrial needs
within the state. 9' Courts have upheld the authority of permit systems in Great
Lakes jurisdictions, thus legitimizing the abrogation of riparian rights

thereunder. 9
87. For example, the Minnesota permit system establishes that water allocations shall
be based on the following priorities for appropriation and use of water: First priority:
Domestic Water Supply, excluding industrial and commercial uses of municipal
water supply. Agricultural irrigation, involving consumption in excess of 10,000
gallons per day. Second priority: Any use of water that involves consumption of
less than 10,000 gallons of water per day. Third priority: Power production, involving consumption in excess of 10,000 gallons per day. . . . Fourth Priority:
Industrial and commercial uses, involving consumption in excess of 10,000 gallons
per day. Fifth priority: Other uses, involving consumption in excess of 10,000 gallons
per day.
Min. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (1A) (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
88. Under common law riparianism, use of the water in a waterbody was restricted to riparian
owners, and they were limited to reasonable use of the water. See supra notes 69 & 70. Permit
systems establish use priorities so that certain beneficial uses are satisfied for nonriparians before
lower priority uses are satisfied for riparians. Thus, permit systems greatly expand public usufructuary rights. Riparian rights, however, are not altogether abrogated. For example, in one jurisdiction, the nonriparian public may be granted usufructuary rights in surplus water but non-surplus
water may only be diverted by nonriparians with the consent of riparian owners damaged thereby.
See, e.g., WVs. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(1) (West 1973). Also see generally Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 8 Wis. 2d 582, 99 N.W.2d 821 (1959).
89. Prior to the establishment of state permit systems, municipal government controlled the
allocation of usufructuary rights, in conjunction with common law adjudication of disputes between riparian landowners as to use of a shared waterbody.
90. See supra note 23.
91. However, the Supreme Court has carefully distinguished a state's authority, under its
police power, to protect the health and welfare of its citizens from its authority to protect the
health of its economy. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3464.
92. The rights of riparian owners may be controlled by state regulation as a valid exercise
of the police power. The prohibition of diversion of water from streams by riparian parties without
a permit does not constitute a taking of property from riparians without compensation but is
a valid exercise of police power to protect public rights. Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 21,
218 N.W.2d 734, 743 (1974). See also Village of Riverwoods v. Department of Transp., 77 Ill.
2d 130, 395 N.E.2d 555 (1979), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that, under the Illinois
permit system which allocates Lake Michigan water, the failure of the state to accord to municipal
corporations abutting Lake Michigan water use requests on the basis of alleged riparian and
prescriptive rights did not violate the due process clause of the Federal or Illinois Constitution. Id.
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A state's "ownership" of water in its capacity as public trustee is fundamentally the power to allocate usufructuary rights. The state itself has no usufructuary interest in the water. After the state has exercised its right to divert

water, the state's function is to assign its usufructuary rights to another party,
the actual user in a beneficial sense."3 This assignment of usufructuary rights
is achieved through the state permit system.

The most comprehensive state permit system generally provides for statewide
water inventory control, a determination of beneficial use priorities and temporal restrictions on water use. In marked contrast to the original common
law riparian approach, a permit system enables a state to provide water for
a wide variety of beneficial uses, regardless of the location of use.9 ' Any party
which establishes a beneficial use for water may receive a usufructuary right
in the form of a permit conferred by the state agency. The agency may modify
beneficial use priorities in response to socio-economic changes within the state
so that it can fulfill water use needs with greater accuracy and efficiency. 5
A permit system provides an administrative mechanism for enforcement of
use priorities, 96 and a party with a higher priority use is entitled to its full
allotment before a lower priority user is entitled to any water. 9 7

93. The state has the exclusive power to confer usufructuary rights upon its political subdivisions, corporations, individuals, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (West 1977 & Suppp.
1984), and in some cases, governmental units of another state. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.405(2) (West 1977); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 123.383 (West 1967).
94. Under the state permit systems, usufructuary rights are predicted upon the beneficial
use of water and the type of beneficial use rather than the location of use. This policy is in
marked contrast to the common law requirement in riparian jurisdictions that water use be restricted
to locations on riparian land. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41, subd. la (West 1977).
95. A model of a comprehensive state water permit system is the Iowa system. See generally
IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.261-.280 (West Supp. 1983). For an excellent discussion of Iowa water
use policy under this extensive and sophisticated water code, see Note, A Proposalfor a Regulated
Market of Water Rights in Iowa, 65 IowA L. Rav. 979 (1980).
Of the existing permit systems in Great Lakes jurisdictions, the Minnesota system best exemplifies a comprehensive state water use plan. Relevant provisions are as follows: "The state,
to the extent provided by law . . . shall control the appropriation and use of surface and
underground waters of the state." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38 (West 1977). The state water
commissioner must "contemplate the conservation, allocation and development of all the waters
of the state, surface and underground, for the best interests of the people." Id. § 105.39(1).
Furthermore, the commissioner shall have administration over the use, allocation and control
of public waters, the establishment, maintenance and control of lake levels. Id. § 105.39(3). "The
commissioner shall establish and maintain a state-wide system to gather, process and disseminate
information on the availability, distribution ... and use of waters of the state." Id. § 105.39(6).
96. This is in contrast to a judicial determination of "reasonable use" by each riparian party
to a usufructuary dispute, where equity balances the reasonable needs of each party in accordance with the amount of available surplus water.
97. See supra note 88. The requirement of a permit by a riparian to divert water from a
stream or lake abrogated the common law riparian right of irrigation. This resulted in introducing for the first time an element of prior use, an integral aspect of the doctrine of prior appropriation, in Wisconsin water law. Omernick v. Department of Natural Resources, 71 Wis. 2d 370,
373, 238 N.W.2d 114, 116, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976).
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EXPORTATION OF GREAT LAKES WATER BY RIPARIAN STATES AS A

BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER

Under state common law riparian doctrine a use of water on nonriparian
land is per se unreasonable use, 98 and therefore it might seem logical to conclude that Great Lakes water cannot be used in nonriparian states. However,
consideration of several other important factors leads to a different conclusion. First, the incorporation of the beneficial use concept in riparian jurisdictions mitigates the strict application of the reasonable use doctrine" and several
riparian states have relied upon this development in adopting statutory provisions which allow surplus water to be exported for use at locations outside
state boundaries.' 00 Additionally, there is federal law specifically authorizing
a riparian state to divert Great Lakes water through the Chicago Canal to
a location outside the Great Lakes Basin. In 1925, the Supreme Court sanctioned this diversion of water from the Great Lakes Basin and into the
Mississippi River Basin.' 0' That a riparian state may determine that a beneficial
02
use for Great Lakes water exists at a location outside the Great Lakes Basin
indicates that a riparian
state may legally determine that exportation of water
03
is a beneficial use.
Second, in matters of interstate water allocation strict riparian doctrine is
not the applicable allocative standard, notwithstanding the fact that all states
involved subscribe to the common law riparian doctrine.' 04 For example, in
Colorado v. New Mexico,'15 the Supreme Court stated
98. See supra note 71.
99. See supra note 88.
100. In New York, a county water district administrator may sell excess water to parties outside the district and water may be transported into another state if done under the auspices
of a permit issued by the state water administrator. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 15-1505 (McKinney Supp. 1983). Michigan law also expressly provides for exportation. MIcH. CoMrn. LAws ANN.
§ 123.383 (West 1967). Illinois statute allows the regulated diversion of water to out-of-state
locations through the Chicago Canal. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, § 120.1 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp.
1983)). Wisconsin law does not expressly allow water exports to other states but does provide
for transfers of water between watersheds. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(la) (West 1973). However,
none of these statutes makes explicit provision for assessment of beneficial uses of water at points
outside state boundaries.
101. In Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) the Court noted that the diversion of water through the Chicago Canal was authorized by Congress in 1822, 3 Stat. 659, and
in 1827, 4 Stat. 234. Id. at 427. Subsequently, the Court has reviewed and authorized continuing
diversions through the Canal. See supra note 14. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929),
281 U.S. 696 (1929), 289 U.S. 395 (1933), 388 U.S. 426 (1967), 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
102. The facts of SanitaryDistrict could cause some debate as to where the beneficial use
occurred. Chicago derived benefit from the disposal of sewage into the Chicago Canal but there
is also evidence of beneficial uses of the water in the Chicago Canal at points outside the Great
Lakes Basin. See Sanitary District, 266 U.S. at 431.
103. When a state chooses to export water, it is engaged in fulfilling the usufructuary needs
of citizens of a foreign state, and its own citizens benefit from the receipt by the state treasury
of the revenues thereby generated.
104. See infra notes 105 & 107.
105. 103 S. Ct. 539 (1982).
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[tihe laws of the contending states concerning intrastate water disputes
are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment [of the
rights to use water of an interstate stream] .... But state law is not controlling. Rather, the just apportionment of interstate waters is a question
of federal law that depends "upon a consideration of the pertinent laws
of the contending States and all other relevant facts." '

Therefore, in a dispute between riparian states on the issue of exportation,
the Court would apply a standard of reasonable use which differs from the
standard that a court would apply in a dispute between private parties under
the riparian doctrine."°7 In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, the Supreme
Court explicitly acknowledged that one state's "most beneficial use of...
water might be in another state."'0 0 Therefore, it would appear that the
Supreme Court is not precluded from applying prior appropriation standards
if the Court deems it necessary due to socio-economic circumstances within
the contending states. In addition, Supreme Court affirmation of the right
of a riparian state to divert water to points outside the Great Lakes Basin
can be inferred from the Court's holding in New Jersey v. New York.'19 The
Court held that New York could divert water between intrastate watersheds,

an action inconsistent with the riparian doctrine of reasonable use, stating
that "the removal of water to a different watershed obviously must be allowed
at times unless States are to be deprived of the most beneficial use on formal
grounds.'""° While the Court was clearly referring to intrastate water transfers,
it did expressly establish that diversion of water to nonriparian land is legitimate
if it fosters beneficial use of water.
As outlined earlier, the modification of the common law in riparian jurisdictions which granted usufructuary rights to nonriparian parties was a direct
response to an increased demand for water for an expanding variety of
beneficial uses in new areas of the public sector within the growth-oriented
economy of the Great Lakes Basin. At present, an analogous growth trend
on the interstate, or federal, level suggests a probable demand for the federal
common law' to accommodate the increasing demand for Great Lakes water

106. Id. at 545-46 (emphasis by the Court) (citations omitted).
107. See New Jersey v. NewYork, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669 (1930); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 102-05, 113-14 (1907).
108. 102 S. Ct. at 3465.
109. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
110. Id. at 343.

111. The concept of interstate, or federal common law is applicable to water law. "When
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is federal common
law ...." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,'406. U.S. 91, 103 (1972). See also Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). But in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court
held that the respondents no longer had a common law remedy since the 1972 Amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, enacted subsequent to the initial proccedings in
this case, established an administrative scheme which thoroughly addresses the problem of effluent limitations. "[W]hen Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision
rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts disappears." Id. at 305.
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for alleged" 2 beneficial uses in nonriparian states. The federal common law,
by incorporating the beneficial use criteria, could determine that riparian states
do not possess exclusive Great Lakes usufructuary rights. Using this

methodology, the federal common law may accord riparian states superior
usufructuary rights since they are the earlier, or senior, appropriators. Those
states would therefore be entitled to continue to fulfill all existing beneficial
uses for water, and unappropriated water might be considered available for
use in nonriparian states. If such a trend does manifest in federal common
law jurisprudence, usufructuary rights will no longer be strictly appurtenant

to the land contiguous to the waterbody from which the water is diverted.
Water diverted from an interstate waterbody-such as the Great Lakes-would
therefore be more freely transferable to any location for beneficial use.'' 3
COMMERCE CLAUSE IMPACT ON EXPORTATION OF GREAT LAKES
WATER FOR USE AT LOCATIONS OUTSIDE THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
It is possible, even probable, that a national market for Great Lakes water
will develop. If a riparian state determines that it has a supply of water in
excess of its own needs," it may have an economic or political incentive to
bargain with nonriparian states for the sale ' 5 of water. Sales of surplus water
6
may generate substantial revenue for the state treasury.'
112. This raises the issue of which state would have the power to determine and enforce beneficial
use priorities. Realistically, riparian states may not have the means to control ultimate beneficial
use in another state. However, a federal beneficial use standard or a water pricing mechanism
might exert great influence in this area. It should be noted that the federal beneficial use standard will be fraught with conflict since it will be influenced by regional economic needs and
divergent professional opinions as to use priorities. For example, while coal slurry pipelines are
advanced by some commentators as necessary to meet the nation's future engergy needs, some
economists and ecologists consider use of water for coal slurry to be a non-beneficial use.
113. This reasoning comports with the contemporary requirement, under a commerce clause
analysis, that water be treated as an article of commerce.
114. In fact, state law requires that a state ascertain that it has adequate water to meet intrastate needs before it may permit exportation of water. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.405(2)
(West Supp. 1984). There is evidence which suggests that the integrity of Great Lakes water
levels can be preserved in the face of greater diversions from the Lakes. For example, § 166
of the Water Resources Development Act of 1976, P.L. 94-587, 90 Stat. 2917 (1976), authorized
the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Army Corps of Engineers, to conduct a study
to determine the feasibility of increasing the diversion at the Chicago Canal from the present
limit of 3,200 cfs up to 10,000 cfs. This study determined that a significant increase in the diversion rate is possible. Specifically, it would be possible to divert up to an annual average of 8,700
cfs during periods when water supply in the Great Lakes is at above-average levels. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 4-8 to -19.
115. There is a significant difference between the sale of water and the sale of a usufructuary
right to water. Sale of water indicates that water is a commodity to be used consumptively,
that is, used in a manner so as never again to be available for use by others. See infra note
197. In the context of Great Lakes water exportation, sale is a more appropriate term since
this Note proposes that only water designated for consumptive use should be legally available
for export. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
116. Water is a uniquely versatile commodity. Its economic value varies greatly, depending
upon how it is used. Therefore, the economic value of a usufructuary right also should vary
according to the benefit it confers upon the user. To date, water pricing mechanisms typically
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Water is relatively abundant in the Great Lakes Basin," 7 and, as a result,
the legal concept of "surplus water" is incorporated in the statutes of several
riparian states.'1 8 Since surplus water has been defined as any water in a waterbody which is not being beneficially used," 9 much of the Great Lakes water
might well be considered "surplus" by this theory of measurement.

2°

In the

Great Lakes region, several riparian states have adopted statutory provisions
which allow surplus water to be exported for use at locations outside state

boundaries.' 2'
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,'22 the Supreme Court held that

groundwater is an article of commerce. The Sporhasedecision ended a longstanding controversy as to whether a state's regulation of intrastate water

resources is subject to constitutional commerce clause scrutiny. In Sporhase,
the Court determined that a statutory restriction on exportation of groundwater resources was not a reasonable exercise of the states' police power, finding "no evidence that [the statutory restriction] is narrowly tailored to the
conservation and preservation rationale"' 2 3 which affords a state a limited
right to restrict a precious natural resource to intrastate use.'2 The Court
applied the "'strictest scrutiny' reserved for facially discriminatory
legislation"2' because the Nebraska statute constituted an explicit barrier to
interstate commerce in water.' 26 The Court was reluctant "to condemn as
unreasonable measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own
do not reflect the actual use value of water. While traditionally the price of water has been
the cost of its distribution, K.S.B. Tech. Sales v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n,
75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), under the emerging trend the full economic value of water
may be priced. For example, the Energy Transportation System, Inc. recently contracted for
an annual supply of 20,000 acre feet of water for an annual cost of $9 million, and the Intermountain Power Project in Central Utah will spend $80 million to acquire 45,000 acre feet of
water. See generally Clyde, supra note 12, at 539 n.35.
117. The Great Lakes Basin is replete with underground and surface waterbodies and receives
average annual precipitation in the amount of 32 inches. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 3-4.
118. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(1) (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.405(2) (West
Supp. 1984).
119. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(2) (West 1973).
120. The vast water surface of the Great Lakes means that small changes in the levels of
the Lakes account for large quantities of water. "The immense storage capacity of the [L]akes...
make them a highly effective naturally-regulated water system." INTERNATIONAL JOINT CoMMIsSION, supra note 1, at 3-8. However, the prevailing legal assumptions which define "surplus water"
and "beneficial" use reflect a particular ideological bias which conforms to concepts promulgated
under the prior appropriation doctrine. These assumptions are utilitarian but may be modified
in the future if changed circumstances so require. The ecological approach to the Great Lakes
urged by the International Joint Commission science advisors implies a much broader sense of
beneficial use, which tends to conform to riparian concepts which advocate the protection of
Lake levels and stream flows. Beneficial use could be defined as maintenance of Lake levels to
benefit fish populations, and not only to include beneficial consumptive uses by human beings.
121. See supra note 100.
122. 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
123. Id.at 3465.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Id.
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citizens this vital resource"2 7 in times of shortage,"'2 8 and delineated the reasons
why great deference to state control over intrastate water resources must be
observed.
First, a state's power to regulate the use of water in times and places of
shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens-and not
simply the health of its economy-is at the core of its police power....
Second, the legal expectation that under certain circumstances each state
may restrict water within its borders has been fostered over the years not
only by our equitable apportionment decrees but also by the negotiation
and enforcement of interstate compacts. Third, although Appellee's claim
to public ownership of Nebraska groundwater cannot justify a total denial
of federal regulatory power, it may support a limited preference for its
own citizens in the utilization of the resource.' 29

It is likely that the Supreme Court will eventually be confronted with the
issue of whether the water in the Great Lakes should be treated as an article
of commerce. In the wake of the Sporhase holding that groundwater is an
article of commerce, the application of commerce clause considerations to
the issue of the legality of Great Lakes water exportation would appear to
be entirely appropriate. The application of the surplus water concept to determine the availability of water for export is strongly correlated with a commerce clause analysis, and it would seem reasonable for the Court to consider
Great Lakes water to be an article of commerce after it has been diverted
for use by riparian states.
Since surplus water has been defined as any water in a waterbody which
is not being beneficially used, 30 if a riparian state possesses unexercised or
unallocated usufructuary rights to a quantity of Great Lakes water for which
it has no present intrastate beneficial use, it would not be a violation of the
public trust or the police power to export the water.13' If a riparian state
statute were to prohibit exportation of surplus water under these circumstances,
or if the statute had the effect of prohibiting exportation, it would certainly
be subjected to strict commerce clause scrutiny. If the Court were to determine that the statute bears no reasonable relationship to state conservation
of a resource vital to the welfare of its citizens, under the standard enun127. In the earlier stages of litigation, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated, in dictum, "since
water is the only natural resource absolutely essential to human survival, the application of rules
designed to facilitate commerce in less essential resources to the transfer of water must be done,
if at all, with extreme caution." State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 710, 305 N.W.2d
614, 619 (1981). Furthermore, the court noted its concern that water be "available to everyone
in the state in relation to their need, rather than their ability to pay for it." 208 Neb. at 708,
305 N.W.2d at 617. This statement reflects growing public concern in Great Lakes states that
private industrial users and other corporate interests in arid states may gain access to Great Lakes
water resources, with the result that ordinary municipal users, as well as industrial users, in
the Great Lakes region will be priced out of the market.
128. 102 S. Ct. at 3464.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 68. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(2) (West 1973).
131. In fact, statutes in many riparian states make provision for water exportation since they
are accustomed to possession of abundant water supplies. See infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
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ciated in Sporhase, the statute would very likely be violative of the commerce
clause. Of course, the Court would analyze each state statute in the context
of the particular regional circumstances. Most specifically, in regard to Great
Lakes water, the Court would apply the alternate aspect of the commerce
clause standard, and would accord paramount deference to the maintenance
of Lake levels adequate for navigation.' 32
As noted by the Court in Sporhase, the existence of numerous federal statutes
and interstate compacts demonstrate congressional deference to state water
law but "they do not indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional restraints on such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to which Congress has deferred."' 33 The federal
interest in "conservation ...

[and] ...fair allocation of diminishing water

resources""34 is an especially significant interest where the water resources
clearly have an interstate dimension.' State statutory regulation of Great
Lakes usufructuary rights would be subject to commerce clause scrutiny under
this standard. The fact that a riparian state will only allow the sale of surplus
water demonstrates that parties within riparian states have much greater access to Great Lakes water than parties in nonriparian states. Such a policy
seeks to ensure that Lake levels and intra-basin users receive adequate protection, while it indicates that commerce clause requirements are met.
Great Lakes states may decide to withhold intra-basin water resources from
exportation for the sake of economic protectionism-to keep business and
industry from moving to arid states sustained by supplies of water imported
from riparian states. However, such economic protectionism is on its face
violative of the commerce clause. In regard to a state's police power authority to supply its inhabitants with water, the Sporhase Court stated, "[flor
Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between
economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation
136
on the other."'
In order to survive contemporary commerce clause scrutiny, state permit
systems must be designed so that water is made available for use in nonriparian
states while precluding detrimental impact upon intrastate uses by the citizens
of riparian states.' 37 In other words, properly designed state water permit
132. See supra note 35.

133. 102 S. Ct. at 3466 (emphasis by the Court).
134. Id. at 3457.

135. This case involved an interstate aquifer underlying parts of Nebraska, Colorado, Texas,
New Mexico, Oklahoma and Kansas. "Groundwater overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that scale." Id. at 3463.
136. Id. at 3464.
137. A model of such an approach is the Illinois permit system. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, §§
119-120.11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
Regional organizations, municipalities, political subdivisions . . .and any other
organization, association or individual desiring to use water from Lake Michigan
and subject to allocation under this Act shall make application to the Department
[of Transportation] on forms provided by such agency which shall include a state-
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systems should protect intrastate usufructuary needs by designating them as
the highest priority public uses while making reasonable provision for out-ofstate uses as lower priority uses.' 38 Arguably, a state does not abdicate its
public trust or police power responsibilities in regard to state water resources
by means of such permit provisions if water exportation is designated as a
low priority use.
Under such a system, before a state administrative agency can authorize
exportation of water, it is required by state statute to assess whether intrastate
water needs are being met and should do so in order to defend against possible challenge to its authority.' 39 If the state determines that there is surplus
water in the state's inventory, it may authorize exports. To do so is good
public policy since surplus water, by definition, is not being beneficially used
by the inhabitants of the state and therefore may not fit under the rationale
of the public trust doctrine.' 4 This approach is designed to encourage the
state to promote the beneficial use of such water, even if such use is designated
4
at an out-of-state or out-of-basin location.' '

ALLOCATIVE STANDARDS DETERMINING THE RIGHT OF EACH RIPARIAN
STATE TO EXPORT WATER

In the Great Lakes Basin, individual states make provision for water exportation but view exports of water by neighboring riparian states with jealous
suspicion and concern. Controversy has arisen as to whether a riparian state
can assert such dominion over water diverted from the Great Lakes so as
to have the authority to assign its rights to a nonriparian party and allow
the water to be transported in interstate commerce despite the protests of other
ment or finding relative to other sources of water or lack thereof within the area,
the need for such allocation ... the purpose or use to be made of the water so
allocated, the point of diversion and the location of discharge after use ....
Id. § 120.3. The Department of Transportation shall "enter into agreements with any and all
agencies of the United States, other States, municipal corporations of this and other States [etc.]
*
for the regulation and maintenance of the levels of Lake Michigan and for the extraction
and utilization of waters taken from Lake Michigan .... ." Id. § 120. See also Village of Riverwoods v. Department of Transp., 77 Ill. 2d 130, 395 N.E.2d 555 (1979).
138. The Minnesota system seems to resemble this formula. Priorities 1-4 presumably pertain
to intrastate uses since the statute discourages the issuance of permits for out-of-state use. The
fifth priority could be interpreted to allow use outside state boundaries, if exportation were
designated as a beneficial "other use." See supra note 87.
139. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, § 120.3, 120.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105.405(2) (West Supp. 1984).
140. However, the aesthetic value in maintaining the integrity of a waterbody is an important
consideration under the riparian doctrine. The state, as trustee of public waters, may have an
obligation to protect the recreational value of a waterbody and to give adequate protection to
wetlands areas. Most importantly, the state can not alienate trust property unless it "can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining." Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (emphasis added).
141. See 102 S. Ct. at 3463, where the Court stated that one state's water might be most
beneficially used in another state and suggested the appropriate imposition of a federal beneficial
use standard.
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riparian states. At present, the United States Supreme Court is the sole forum
available to riparian states for adjudication of disputes involving water
exportation.' 2 Equitable apportionment is the standard by which the Court
allocates the water of a waterbody common to several states so as to meet
the reasonable needs for water in each state.4 3 The doctrine of equitable apportionment is analogous to the riparian doctrine of reasonable use 4 4 but
does not preclude use of water on nonriparian land.
Equitable apportionment of the benefits of a waterbody is the measure of
the reciprocal rights and obligations of the respective states.' 5 The Supreme
Court, in determining equitable apportionment, generally weighs the benefit
of the diversion to one riparian state against the detriment resulting to the
contending riparian state. 4 6 In Wisconsin v. Illinois,'" the Supreme Court
established the right of each riparian state to assert limitations on withdrawals

so as to insure equitable apportionment of the water.'4 8 The Court emphasized that what is equitable depends upon the reasonable needs of each state
which exist at the time of the litigation.

The method of the Supreme Court in apportioning water between states
is to determine whether an existing or planned diversion of water from an
interstate waterbody is within the equitable share of the diverting state.,

The

Court generally limits itself to deciding the issue of equitable apportionment
and refrains from extending its authority into state-level decisionmaking

142. Controversies between two or more states are, by art. III of the Federal Constitution,
subject to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. "The judicial power shall extend...
to Controversies between two or more States . . . . In all cases . . . in which a State shall be
a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. V 1976). See generally Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
143. In Colorado v. New Mexico the Court explained that
[e]quitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes
between states concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream....
It is a flexible doctrine which calls for "the exercise of an informed judgment on
a consideration of many factors" to secure a "just and equitable" allocation ....
Our aim is always to secure a just and equitable apportionment without quibbling
over formulas."
103 S. Ct. at 545 (citations omitted).
144. For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 100 (1907), the Court enunciated the
following standard:
We must consider the effect of what has been done upon the conditions in the
respective States and so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights as
to secure .. . to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of
the like beneficial effects of a flowing stream.
But see Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931), where the Court held that
the fact that both states which are parties to a water use controversy follow the riparian doctrine
does not dictate its use as the basis for the settlement of the interstate controversy.
145. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 385 (1943).
146. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 100 (1907).
147. 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
148. Id. This case best exemplifies the magnitude of past, present and future legal disagreements
which may exist between riparian states on the issue of water exportation.
149. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 393-94.

19841

WATER RIGHTS

processes.' 50 The Court thus ordinarily refrains from specifying beneficial use
priorities or other types of restrictions such as specified land parameters for
use.'"

Supreme Court deference to state authority over allocation of state waters,
diverted from the Great Lakes under a decree of equitable apportionment,
would presumably extend to riparian state provisions allowing the subsequent
exportation of the water to points beyond state boundaries. 2 Since state water

ownership is the power to allocate usufructuary rights' 5 3 a state has great
latitude, under its police power authority, in determining use priorities.
Therefore, when a state receives an entitlement to a specified amount of water
under a decree of equitable apportionment each state may arguably export
all or any portion of the water to which it is entitled under the decree should
5
it decide that this would constitute the most beneficial use- 4
The Supreme Court will not enjoin one riparian state's diversion of water
in the absence of clear and convincing proof of actual and substantial injury
to the contending riparian state. 55 If a riparian state exports water, it would
be per se immune to claims of injury by a contending riparian state seeking
to enjoin such export as long as the exporting state did not export an amount
of water in excess of its equitable share'56 authorized by a Supreme Court
decree.'" The doctrine of equitable apportionment does not provide
mechanistic guidelines for quantifying shares of water. The Court will weigh
the factors involved as the exigencies of the particular case may require.

150. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426, 427-28, where the Court stated that "[t]he water
permitted ... to be diverted from Lake Michigan may be apportioned by the State of Illinois
... in such manner and amounts .

.

. as the State may deem proper ....

"

151. But see the decree of equitable apportionment issued in Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S.
953 (1957), where the Supreme Court specified that water diverted by Colorado from the Laramie
River must be used only at locations within the state of Colorado, and specified the amount
of water which could be used at locations both within and beyond the river basin.
152. This is the situation with the Chicago Canal diversion. See supra note 150. This raises
the issue of whether the Supreme Court would expressly consider exportation when determining
each state's share of water under the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
153. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
154. For example, under the decree in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. at 427, the state of
Illinois is entitled to an annual diversion rate of 3,200 cfs of water. The Illinois Department
of Transportation has the authority to allocate any portion of that water to an out-of-state location, as long as it follows statutory guidelines.
155. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931); Colorado v. New Mexico, 103
S. Ct. 539, 547 (1982).
156. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 102 (1938).
Colorado can not confer usufructuary rights to any amount of water "in excess of Colorado's
share of the water in the stream; and its share was only an equitable portion thereof." Id. at 102.
157. This is illustrated by Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967), which establishes that
diversion of water to a location outside the Great Lakes Basin is not a per se violation of the
reasonable use rule. See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-70 (1931), where
the Court held that the fact that both states which are parties to a water use controversy follow
the riparian doctrine does not dictate its use as the basis for the settlement of the interstate
controversy. This indicates that prior appropriation concepts may be applied in an interstate
apportionment case involving riparian states.
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Equitable apportionment does not entitle each state to an equal quantity of
water.' 58
A decree of equitable apportionment is not of lasting value to riparian parties since usufructuary needs tend to change over time. 5 9 Therefore, the rights
of riparian parties to export water are also limited and uncertain since the
standard of equitable apportionment changes in accordance with changing
circumstances within the Great Lakes Basin. For example, although the
Supreme Court authorized the diversion at the Chicago Canal, the Court did
not set a permanent standard of reasonableness to govern the diversion of
water to points outside the Basin. While the rights between the parties were
expressly decreed, these rights are both quantitatively and qualitatively limited
to those facts in existence at the time of the ruling. In fact, this decree has
been modified 'several times.' 60
In addition to giving consideration to the interests of other riparian states,
a state desiring to export surplus water must give consideration to and incorporate the constraints imposed by federal interests. In Sanitary District v.
United States,'6 ' the Supreme Court established the supremacy of the federal
interest in maintaining the navigability of the Great Lakes and federal authority
to regulate exportation of water to locations outside the Great Lakes Basin
if such exportation were to impair the navigability of the Lakes.' 62 Furthermore, adequate deference must be given to Canadian usufructuary rights.' 63
A

SUGGESTED FORUM FOR ALLOCATING GREAT LAKES USUFRUCTUARY

RIGHTS
Market demands for Great Lakes water use at locations outside the Great
Lakes Basin,' 64 coupled with contemporary commerce clause impact on the
158. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1930). It is interesting to note differences
in water use among the Lakes themselves. Lakes Michigan and Erie have by far the most water
withdrawn for use. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6-2.

159. See generally Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907). Also, a decree of equitable
apportionment may be subject to change in accordance with legal pronouncements recognizing
new uses for water. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539, 549 (1982), where the
Court held that unspecified "future uses" of water is a valid use category. The Court may also
consider newly developed technologies, such as water recycling processes, which affect usufructuary patterns, or new scientific findings which impact directly upon the diversion capability
of a waterbody. In other words, the Court may be influenced by scientific findings of fact in
regard to hydrologic or ecological factors. Changes in facts and scientific knowledge, from that
which existed at the time a decree was issued, may cause the legal obligations of the states to
change along with those facts.
160. See supra note 101.
161. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
162. Id. See supra notes 34 & 35.
163. See supra notes 41-45.
164. The following is a descriptive scenario which suggests probable development of water
markets in arid western states such as Arizona. An observer has recently noted that in Arizona
[s]ixty percent of the water that the state uses is pumped from the ground, and
it is pumped out at a much greater rate than it is replenished by nature. There
is not much precipitation over most of the state . . . and much of what does fall
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issue of interstate water exportation, make it likely that riparian states will
contract with nonriparian states for sales of Great Lakes water. Since Great
Lakes usufructuary rights are controlled by federal and international law, in
addition to state law, diversion of water for use at locations outside the Great
Lakes Basin is subject to control by each forum which has jurisdiction over
usufructuary rights within each of these sovereign entities. Due to the existence
of multiple forums, usufructuary jurisdiction over Great Lakes water is
characterized by inherent doctrinal and administrative impediments which
militate against the exportation of "surplus" water to points outside the Great
the optimal utilization of Great Lakes water for
Lakes Basin and precludes
65
the public benefit.1

Each riparian state must have a legally sanctioned use priority to a specified
equitable share of water if litigation between riparian states over the issue
of water exportation is to be avoided. Clarification and consensus as to what
amounts of water constitute equitable shares can only be achieved by negotiation between riparian states.166 Under the present system, a riparian state which
is consumed in evaporation and transpiration. Tucson, the state's second-largest
city, depends entirely upon groundwater for its supplies; Pima County, which surrounds Tucson, consumes 4.7 times the dependable supply of water. Statewide,
the rate of groundwater depletion has been calculated at 1.7 times the dependable
supply. Each year about 2,500,000 acre feet of water, or more than 814,000,000,000
gallons, is overdrafted-"mined." The Geological Survey has reported that a large
portion of the Arizona landscape, in a 4,500-square-mile area... (around Phoenix),
has subsided by as much as seven feet in the years between 1952 and 1978, due
to . . . overdraft [for agricultural uses].
F. POWLEDGE, \VATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND ABUSED
RESOURCE 147 (1982). "Agriculture uses 89 percent of the state's water." Id. at 148. Large Arizona
cities are rapidly expanding urban areas that have "been forced to bloom on a desert." Id. at 147.
It does not appear that Arizonians are coming to what might seem to be the inevitable conclusion about the necessary limitations to their growth. It is not likely that Arizona will run out
of water since the demands for development are present. It may merely be that Arizonians will
have to pay more money for water, in utilizing new sources of supply, such as the Great Lakes
and it is likely that agricultural and industrial water users in states like Arizona will pay a premium
to attain new sources of water. In the event that arid states find it necessary in the future to
restrict intrastate water resources to highest priority uses-such as municipal uses-the state may
act as a conduit between the agricultural and industrial use sectors within the state and riparian
states offering water supplies. It is suggested that the importing state should credit the water
into its water inventory and assign usufructuary rights under its own system of beneficial uses,
designating special use priorities for imported water and charging a higher rate for it. This would
serve to defray the substantial administrative and transportation costs associated with long distance
water transport and encourage conservation. Industrial and agricultural use sectors will be expected to utilize imported water, since they can afford to pay higher rates, unlike private parties
within the municipal water use sector. It is unlikely that, in the absence of a compact agreement
between the exporting (riparian) and importing (nonriparian) state, that the riparian state could
effectively control the use to which the water is put in the nonriparian state. The most effective
means of controlling the use of the water is the pricing system utilized in the sale of water.
165. As stated in the Introduction, the "public" will increasingly include water users in
nonriparian states as well as present and potential water users in riparian states. See supra note
8 and accompanying text.
166. Such an approach is implicit in H.R. 4545 which would rely on the use of an interstate
compact for regional governance of Great Lakes water use. See supra note 15. While a possible
effect of H.R. 4545, if it were law, would be to enjoin exportation by riparian states in an
absolute sense, the Bill suggests that exportation would be possible because it would establish
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exports Great Lakes water for use outside the Basin will continually be
vulnerable to suit by other riparian sates. Contending states will assert that
the export of such water interferes with the exercise of their own usufructuary rights. These states will rely primarily on the reasonable use doctrine
in attempting to convince the Supreme Court that water exportation violates

the prevailing standard of equitable apportionment. If the exportation of Great
Lakes water itself is not challenged, or not successfully challenged, other
riparian states may, in the alternative, assert that they are entitled to a portion of the substantial revenue generated upon the sale of water by a riparian
state to a nonriparian state.
The Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged its limitations as a forum
for adjudication of water disputes between states, making reference to the
unique nature of the disputes which arise out of possession of common water
resources by two or more states, 6 ' and the problem that this poses to the
Court.'" The Court has frankly recommended that states resolve their water
use disputes by interstate compact instead of litigation.' 6 9 Interstate compacts

are commonly used to allocate usufructuary rights in interstate waterbodies.' 0
The Great Lakes states formally recognized the need for an interstate forum
to govern the use of the Great Lakes by ratifying the Great Lakes Basin

Compact 7 ' in 1955. The stated purpose of the Compact is to "promote the
orderly, integrated, and comprehensive development, use, and conservation
a consortium of the riparian states so that state export provisions affecting the common waterbody
could be explicitly negotiated among the states. A relevant Bill, introduced in Congress in 1981,
also proposed this approach. It was drafted in response to riparian disputes in the Missouri
River Basin. The Bill would have prohibited "any State from selling or otherwise transferring
interstate waters located in such State for use outside such State unless all other States in the
drainage basin of such waters consent to such sale or transfer." H.R. 5278, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). HR 5278 died in committee. It is interesting to compare its provisions with those
of S. 2026, H.R. 4366 and H.R. 4545. See supra note 15.
167. "[W]henever . . . the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws
into the territory of another State, . . . this court is called upon to settle that dispute in such
a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice between
them." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
168. The Court has explained that
[t]he reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such
cases is that, while we have jurisdiction over such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due
to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule.
Kansas v. Colorado, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
169. 320 U.S. at 392 (1943). Interstate compacts are authorized under the compact clause of
the federal constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. See generally Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1900).
170. These water compacts include the La Plata River Compact of 1925 between Colorado
and New Mexico, 43 Stat. 796 (1925); the Republican River Compact of 1943 between Colorado,
Kansas and Nebraska, 57 Stat. 86 (1943); the Costilla Creek Compact of 1946 between Colorado
and New Mexico, 60 Stat. 246 (1946); and the Arkansas River Compact of 1949 between Colorado and Kansas, 63 Stat. 145 (1949). See also F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE
COMPACT SINCE 1925 16 n.75 (1951).
171. Great Lakes Basin Compact, 82 Stat. 414 (1968). See supra note 29, for information
about Illinois ratification in 1955.
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of the water resources'" of the Great Lakes Basin . . . [and] [t]o advise in
securing and maintaining a proper balance among industrial, commercial,
agricultural water supply, residential, recreational
and other legitimate uses
73
of the water resources of the Basin."'
The Great Lakes Basin Compact is ineffectual because it fails to promulgate
or enforce standards for beneficial use of Great Lakes water. The existing
Great Lakes Basin Compact created a forum of limited advisory powers,' 74
and therefore did not establish adequate administrative provisions to allocate
Great Lakes usufructuary rights under present day demands for water. The
Great Lakes Basin Commission lacks the power to adjudicate and hence has
no authority to decide the issue of equitable apportionment. Compact provisions are devoid of any usufructuary standard or policy in regard to water
allocation among the riparian states.' 75
A compact agreement would be the most effective legal means by which
a riparian state or group of riparian states could control or regulate water
exportation by other riparian states. A compact would provide a formal means
for riparian states to acknowledge the legal right of each state to export a
limited quantity of Great Lakes water in accordance with carefully delineated
guidelines and could contain policy guidelines to promote comity and cooperation between the states.
The present Great Lakes Basin Compact does not promulgate a policy addressing the rights and obligations of riparian states to divert water to states
outside the Great Lakes Basin.' 7 6 While the Compact alludes to the existence
of "other governments" having interests in Great Lakes Basin water resources,
the Compact does not identify other governmental entities, specify the possible usufructuary interests or beneficial uses for Great Lakes water which those
entities might have, or authorize the formation of contractual or other relationships between riparian states and those "other governments." ,' The Great
172. This includes not only surface waters but all waterbodies in the Basin.
173. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. I, 82 Stat. at 414 (emphasis added).
174.
The Commission shall have the power to . . . [m]ake any recommendation and
do all things necessary and proper to carry out the powers conferred upon the
Commission by the compact, provided that no action of this Commission shall

have the force of law in, or be binding upon, any party state.
82 Stat. at 417, 418.
175. Moreover, the Commission has taken a narrow view of its functions and is almost wholly
directed toward economic issues, especially those involving the shipping industry. Article VI merely
states that
[t]he Commission shall have the power to
A. Collect, correlate, interpret, and report on data relating to the water resources
and the use thereof in the Basin . ...
B. Recommend methods for the orderly, efficient, and balanced development,
use and conservation of the water resources of the Basin... to the party states ....
82 Stat. at 417.
176. But see art. VII: "Each party agrees to consider the action the Commission recommends
in respect to . . . . H. Diversion of waters from and into the Basin." 82 Stat. at 418.
177. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. VI: "The Commission shall have the power to: ....
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Lakes Basin Commission does not maintain an inventory of Basin water
resources to provide the indicia necessary to determine how much "surplus"
water in the Great Lakes might be legally available for intrastate use by each
riparian state or for subsequent exportation, or to determine by what criteria
a given volume of water may be declared to be "surplus."
The contemporary concerns of governments in riparian states regarding exportation of Great Lakes water to nonriparian states strongly suggest that
those states would tend to regard it as important that a modified compact
agreement be drafted. A newly formulated compact should establish an administrative forum with the power to allocate Great Lakes usufructuary rights
between riparian states, including allocations of water for subsequent exportation to locations outside the Great Lakes Basin. The use of an administrative
agency for determining facts and adjudicating public rights-such as usufructuary rights between states-would seem to be consistent with due process
and not to constitute an unconstitutional invasion of judicial power.' 7 8 Such
a forum should survive constitutional scrutiny if it were used as a means to
implement those standards which have been enunciated by the Supreme Court
in regard to equitable apportionment and commerce clause considerations. 19
The forum would be required to respect United States' reasonable use obligations as outlined in the Boundary Waters Treaty.' 80
G. [R]ecommend ... laws, ordinances, or regulations relating to the development, use and conservation of the Basin's water resources to the party states . . . and to other governments .. " 82 Stat. at 417.
178. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The legal propriety of interstate or federal
administrative agencies was carefully considered in Crowell where the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a federal administrative agency as a forum for awarding compensation under
provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.
Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it, may establish 'legislative' courts
(as distinguished from 'constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred
by the Constitution can be deposited') . . . to serve as special tribunals "to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others,
which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."
Id. at 50. "Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such
matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to interstate
and foreign commerce, . . .the public lands, . . . [etc.]" Id. at 51.
Congress' power to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the lesser
power to create administrative agencies for the same purpose, and to provide for review of those
agency decisions in article III courts. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18 (1982), citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 450 (1977). The Supreme Court would retain jurisdiction to review the findings of
fact and decisions of the Great Lakes interstate administrative agency.
179. Historically, the Supreme Court has relied upon the special master to determine relevant
facts and to draw conclusions in accordance with applicable legal doctrines.
While the reports of masters ... in such cases are essentially of an advisory nature,
it has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based
upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law, and the parties have no right to
demand that the court shall redetermine the facts thus found.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932). The Court would likely defer in this manner to
the factual determinations made by the interstate administrative agency.
180. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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A compact agreement between riparian states should be a detailed agreement outlining beneficial uses for Great Lakes water and establishing a forum
with administrative powers to enforce its provisions.' 8 1 Those states ratifying
the compact would be entitled to receive and subsequently allocate water on
the basis of criteria outlined in the compact agreement. The administrative
forum should implement policy incorporating both riparian and prior appropriation concepts, making it a conceptually sophisticated forum. Such policy
would reflect what is perceived as the contemporary trend in federal common
law jurisprudence, as reflected in recent Supreme Court decisions. This
"hybrid" common law approach to the allocation of usufructuary rights has
provided an effective and equitable conceptual framework for state water permit systems in the Great Lakes Basin. This same conceptual approach should
also form the matrix of an administrative forum designed to promote the
equitable apportionment of Great Lakes water between riparian states amidst
the increasingly complex context of legally recognized beneficial uses for water,
including the beneficial use category of exportation.
Congress could use its authority in the compact process"8 2 to impose federal
beneficial use criteria, while allowing primary allocative control to remain in
the states. If Congress were to determine that it is in the national interest
for riparian states to prioritize export of water for certain uses in nonriparian
states before allocating water for lower priority uses within the riparian states,
a riparian state would still remain in a position to protect its highest priority
uses.
Following the model of successful state water permit systems, the Great
Lakes Basin Compact should vest in the administrative forum the power to
implement and administer an interstate water permit system."'8 Through the
181. The interstate forum would derive its power from the congressional ratification of the
compact. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. The forum would operate in accordance
with standards promulgated by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1982).
182. Under the compact clause in the Constitution, "[n]o State shall, without the consent
of Congress,... enter into any Agreement with another State, or with a foreign Power ......
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. See generally Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
183. The Colorado River Compact is an example of a compact agreement which established
basic guidelines for the allocation of a water resource common to all of the party states. The
Compact was authorized by Congress in 1921, 42 Stat. 171 (1921), ratified by the state of Arizona
in 1944, 1944 Ariz. Sess. Laws 427, and is currently codified at ARIZ. RE,. STAT. ANN. § 45-471
(Supp. 1983). "The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division
and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System; to establish the relative
importance of different beneficial uses of water . . . ." Colorado River Compact, art. I, ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-741 (Supp. 1983).
The Upper Basin Compact was enacted as an addendum to the Colorado River Compact.
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat. 31 (1949). "The major purposes of this Compact
are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the
Colorado River System, the use of which was apportioned in perpetuity to the Upper Basin
by the Colorado River Compact . . . ." Id. at art. I.
This compact established the Upper Colorado River Commission, an "interstate administrative
agency." Id. at art. VIII. This Commission demonstrates the feasibility of establishing an interstate administrative forum for the allocation of the water resources of an interstate waterbody
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implementation of an interstate permit system, the Great Lakes Basin states
could develop an inventory of Basin water resources and effectively utilize
that data to develop more direct means of augmenting and distributing those
resources. Under the present "state of the art," it is not clear from a scientific standpoint whether there is sufficient water in the Great Lakes specifically,
and in the Great Lakes Basin generally, to meet all reasonable present and
future needs for water by riparian parties in the United States and Canada,
or for additional nonriparian parties in either country. ' To the extent that
surplus water is available, it is highly unlikely that either the United States
or Canada will seek to enjoin the other from future increased diversion of
water from the Lakes since both nations have a history of reliance on Great
Lakes water for both municipal and industrial uses and water-use projections
indicate that both nations plan significant increases in consumption by the
year 2035.'"
The interstate administrative forum would serve to produce the relevant
scientific information, interpreted within a framework of applicable legal doctrines, that would enable riparian states to ascertain relevant answers and
fashion usufructuary policy in a more forthright and informed manner.' s In
this manner the administrative forum would serve to rectify a problem frequently encountered by the Supreme Court-that of lack of adequate information with which to fashion decrees of equitable apportionment. ' The existence of this problem serves to support the contention that the Supreme
Court is not a suitable forum for the adjudication of these matters.
Given that there is great diversity in usufructuary patterns within different
states, both riparian and nonriparian, an important objective to be achieved
by an interstate permit system is to reduce the legal restraints upon the
transferability of water supplies to where they can be most beneficially used.'"
A permit system would allow riparian states to protect the integrity of Lake
levels' 89 and protect local users against extreme export market demands for
water which conceivably might arise,' 90 while implementing a policy which
overcomes the "old politics" of riparianism that has effectively restricted
Great Lakes usufructuary rights to parties within the riparian states.' 9 '
and exemplifies some of the features that should be incorporated in the Great Lakes interstate
administrative forum.
184. For an interesting, albeit outdated, discussion of the water supply and usufructuary needs
in the Great Lakes Basin, see generally Feldman, The Lake Diversion Case-The End of a Cycle,
49 CHI. B. REc. 270 (1968); Meserow, Great Lakes Water-Is There Enough?, 47 CHI. B. REc.
60 (1965).
185. INTERNATIONAL JOINT

CoMMIssION,

supra note 1, at 6-50 to- -52.

186. International Joint Commission study groups are currently engaged in the process of
examination of these scientific and legal issues to some degree.
187. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539 (1982).
188. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3465 (1982), the Supreme
Court specifically stated that the most beneficial use of a state's water conceivably might be
in another state.
189. Maintenance of lake levels and stream flows is a major concern and objective of common law riparianism.
190. See supra notes 8 & 164.
191. The issue of Great Lakes water exportation illustrates the classic tension between the
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The interstate administrative forum, by means of the permit system, should

directly control and regulate water exportation from Great Lakes states to
states outside the Great Lakes Basin. A three-tiered application of the follow-

ing criteria should be used to determine the availability of Great Lakes water
for exportation. Initially, a water level assessment should determine whether
there is water present in excess of that needed to protect the navigability of
92
the Lakes. This would constitute a determination of whether "surplus water"'1
exists. Secondly, each riparian state should be entitled to its equitable share
of the available surplus water in the Lakes, under the doctrine of equitable

apportionment. Finally, a riparian state should be entitled, under its police
power authority, to make a determination that a portion of its equitable share
of water is in excess of its own intrastate needs, and to export that water
to points outside the Great Lakes Basin.

In order to export water to a nonriparian state, a riparian state would be
required to bid for a permit to do so from the interstate administrative forum.
Each riparian state would receive a permit to divert water from the Lakes
on the basis of a temporal period designated as a water year.' 93 This permit
would entitle each state to a certain equitable percentage of the surplus water
available during each water year.
The permit system should allocate water to riparian states by subdivision
into two use categories: consumptive and non-consumptive uses. 9 Most of
the water withdrawn from the Great Lakes is eventually returned to the Great

Lakes hydrologic system by direct discharges into the Lakes or their
tributaries.'19 This constitutes a non-consumptive use of water.' 96 In contrast,
water which is withdrawn from, but not returned to, the Lakes is categorized

riparian doctrine-which tends to inhibit water diversion by limiting use to the reasonable needs
of riparian parties-and the prior appropriation doctrine-which allows diversion of water to
the extent that it will be put to a beneficial use regardless of the location of use.
192. In deference to ecological concerns, this assessment should also provide sufficient consideration and protection of wetland areas.
193. See Colorado River Compact, art. III, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-741 (Supp. 1983);
Upper Colorado River Compact, art. III, 63 Stat. at 32.
194. In the Colorado River Basin, by contrast, all water which is authorized for appropriation
may be used consumptively. See Colorado River Compact, art. III, Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
45-471 (Supp. 1983). This reflects the fact that public policy in the Colorado River Basin favors
consumptive uses of water over the policy objective of maintaining, or restoring, the navigability
of the Colorado River.
Inasmuch as the Colorado River has ceased to be navigable for commerce and
the reservation of its waters for navigation would seriously limit the development
of its Basin, the use of its waters for purposes of navigation shall be subservient
to the uses of such waters for domestic, agricultural and power purposes.
Id. at art. IV(a). This policy demonstrates the extreme effect upon awaterbody which may result
from the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation. In fact, the unmitigated application
of this doctrine may cause a lake or stream to become "extinct." See National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
195. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6-1. Wisconsin law requires that water

withdrawn by public utilities from either Lake Michigan or Superior be returned to the Lakes
in the form of purified effluent. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.21(l) (West 1973).
196. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6-1.
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under the-term consumptive use."' In issuing water use permits, the interstate
administrative forum must incorporate the policy requirements inherent in
the distinction between these two types of water use. Water that is exported

out of the Great Lakes Basin, in the absence of reciprocity requirements,' 98
is permanently severed from its source. In other words, water that is exported
beyond the natural contours of the drainage basin is no longer a part of the
hydrologic cycle of that region. Therefore, allocations intended for export

should only be made following a careful determination of possible permanent
impact on the hydrologic bounty of the Lakes.' 99 Export provisions, to be

successful, must rely on efficiency in record keeping as to inflows and outflows,
inventory levels and on the determination of reliable water demand forecasts." 0
Because of the hydrologic complexity of the Great Lakes, it is necessary

that the interstate administrative forum incorporate a board of scientists and
professional engineers, who would be headed by a chief engineer or water
master."0 ' The water master would serve as the professional voice of the

forum2 2 and would have ultimate responsibility for monitoring Lake levels
and water demand forecasts and for recommending water allocations. The
interstate forum would apportion and allocate whatever, in the judgment of
the water master, constituted surplus water within each water year.20 3 The

197. Id. Historically, consumptive uses have consisted of evaporation during use, leakage from
pipes, and incorporation of water into manufactured products. Id.
198. Reciprocity requirements are subject to strict constitutional scrutiny and may be unconstitutional. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). More importantly,
reciprocity requirements are not feasible between an arid and a humid state. Great Lakes states
would not likely impose such requirements but would instead seek to augment Lake inflows.
199. Water withdrawals in 1975 (75,600 cfs) greatly exceeded the amount of water which was
consumptively used (4,900 cfs). INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 6-1. "Total
water withdrawals from the U.S. portion of the Great Lakes and their drainage basins are expected to increase 120 percent between 1975 and 2035 due to interacting effects of environmental
controls and anticipated growth projections . . . ." Id. at 6-46. "Consumptive water use, that
portion of water withdrawals that is not returned to the system, is expected to be five times
greater in 2035 than it was in 1975." Id. at 6-48. "Currently, approximately 88 percent of the
consumptive uses occur in the United States and 12 percent in Canada. This proportion is expected to change only slightly, being 82 percent in the United States and 18 percent in Canada
by the year 2035." Id. at 9-6.
200. There is a recognized need for greatly improved methods of data collection and statistical
analysis in the area of water demand forecasts and water inventory analysis. See INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION, supra note_ 1, at 6-4. In Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 21, 218 N.W.2d
734, 742-43 (1974), the Wisconsin Supreme Court inferred that an essential function of a permit
system is to provide information to the government in regard to water use and maintenance
of water levels in lakes and streams.
201. The water master concept is commonly employed in irrigation districts. See Gaffney,
Comparison of Market Pricingand OtherMeans of Allocating Water Resources, in WATER LAW
AND POuCY IN THE SOUTHEAST 195, 203 (1962). State permit systems often employ an engineer
to assist in administering water rights. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 97 (1938); United Plainsmen v. Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976). The Upper Colorado River Commission designates an engineer as being an
optional member of the administrative agency. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 63 Stat.
31, 35 (1949).
202. The water master would serve a similar function to that of a special master in Supreme
Court adjudication.
203. See generally ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-581 art. XI-XVII (West 1956) for an example
of the conceptual factors which may be used to determine the availability of water for allocation.

WATER RIGHTS

1984]

Great Lakes are subject to periodic fluctuations in water levels" ' and therefore
the allocative criteria must accommodate these fluctuations, 0 5 if indeed they
can be accommodated.
Lake level fluctuations influence the amount of surplus
20 6
water available.
The effect of a modified compact agreement should be to allow each riparian
state to export legally any portion of its equitable share of water designated

for consumptive use. Since water designated for consumptive use will not return
to the Great Lakes Basin, the state should be legally entitled to designate that

water for any beneficial use it chooses, including exportation of water for
beneficial use in a nonriparian state. This method provides protection for the
integrity of Lake levels and respects each state's right to designate, under its
police power authority and in deference to commerce clause provisions, that
water exportation will be allowed.
An interstate permit system would incorporate most of the same features
of a state permit system. The standard of beneficial use would provide the
basis for granting permits for the diversion of water. The permit mechanism
would include an inventory of Great Lakes Basin water resources, temporal
204. There are three categories of water level fluctuations on the Great Lakes: long-term, seasonal
and short-term.
Long-term fluctuations are the result of persistent low or high water supply conditions within the basin which result in extremely low levels, such as were recorded
in the mid-1960s .... or in extremely high levels, such as [those recorded] in 1973-74
....
Seasonal fluctuations in Great Lakes levels reflect the annual hydrologic
cycle. Short-term fluctuations, lasting from a few hours to several days, are caused
by meteorological disturbances.
INTERNATIONAL JOINT CON91SSION, supra note 1, at 3-1.

205. The level of a lake depends upon the quantity of water entering the lake (inflows) and
the quantity of water leaving the lake (outflows).
The amount of [Llake level and outflow fluctuation in the Great Lakes system
depends on the magnitude of water supply changes and the timing of the passage
of water through the system. These ... are the result of the interaction of the
natural and artificial factors which affect the supply and discharge of water to
and from the system.
Id. See supra note 36.
206. Conservation of water resources can also protect Great Lakes water levels by reducing
the need to divert water. Water leakage problems cause serious losses of water and are common
to municipal water systems. For example, a recent study found that Boston loses about half
its water supply, or 78,000,000 gallons a day, from leaking and broken pipes. New York City's
losses have been estimated to range between 70,800,000 to 20,000,000 gallons a day. F. POwLEDGE,
supra note 164, at 161. The International Joint Commission has determined that most Great
Lakes waterworks systems are plagued with leakage problems. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note I, at 6-8. Another author has stated that "Chicago's watermains, built on shifting sand ....

[leak] .

.

. some 45,000 gallons a day per mile of main-a loss of 285 c.f.s."

Feldman, supra note 184, at 276. Amelioration of structural and leakage problems would increase efficient use of available resources. The Supreme Court recently held that states must
use "reasonable conservation methods" to eliminate "waste and inefficiency in the use of water."
Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539, 549 (1982). Such a state policy is incorporated in
the Illinois permit system which controls the diversion and allocation of Lake Michigan water.
"The Department [of Transportation] shall require that all feasible means reasonably available
to the State and its . . . agencies . . . shall be employed to conserve and manage the water

resources of the region and the use of water therein in accordance with the best modern scientific
knowledge and engineering practice." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19 § 120.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
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limitations on water use, 20 7 beneficial use priorities and guidelines for reassignment of usufructuary rights in the event that changed socio-economic conditions necessitate changed use priorities. A permit would be granted for a
specified period of time, 208 and would be subject to modification or cancellation if a breach of the conditions of the permit should occur, for an extended
period of non-use, 2 9 or when necessary to protect those use priorities which
are outlined in the compact. For example, the permit system could provide
for suspension of permits, in the event of drought or other emergency.2"'
The interstate administrative forum should consist of representatives of each
member state, as well as federal and international representatives. In the
event that the administrative framework is incapable of resolving a particular
dispute, each state would retain the right to pursue its legal remedies. However,
public policy favors the requirement that, except when an emergency injunction is sought, a riparian state should pursue its remedies within the administrative forum prior to pursuing legal remedies. At each point at which
usufructuary rights are to be allocated, notice and a hearing will be afforded
to all interested parties. In this manner, the forum should effectively provide
thorough due process protections for each riparian state in regard to any ma211
jor water allocation decision.
207. Time is a crucial factor in a water use permit; either because of seasonal or daily fluctuations in water levels. Water supply contracts ordinarily address the rate of withdrawal, expressed
as cubic feet per second, as well as total water allotment, expressed in acre feet. An acre foot
of water is the amount of water required to cover an acre to a depth of one foot.
208. The marketability of Great Lakes water depends upon nonriparian investors gaining a
secure usufructuary right for a specified period of time. An investor-whether private, municipal
or state-at a nonriparian location can amortize the investment over the designated useful life
of the diversion project and receive a calculated return on the investment. See generally Note,
supra note 95, at 1010-12.
209. Non-use of water is generally not regarded as a beneficial use of water if such water
is part of an allotment specified in an outstanding permit. But see Colorado v. New Mexico,
103 S. Ct. 539, 549 (1982), where the Court held that unspecified "future uses" is a beneficial use.
210. Drought is not a likely occurrence in the Great Lakes region, which receives average
annual precipitation in the amount of 32 inches. However, protracted excesses and deficiencies
in precipitation have caused variations in Lake levels. Periodic fluctuations in Lake levels may
produce, in effect, drought conditions. For example, record high precipitation in the late 1940's
and early 1950's resulted in high Lake levels. Only twelve years later below-normal precipitation
caused record low Lake levels in the 1960s. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 3-2. See also supra note 204.
211. The Administrative Procedure Act promulgates due process and judicial review standards.
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1982). The Wisconsin permit system incorporates an administrative
hearing process which is instructive.
At the conclusion of the [permit] hearing, if it appears that the water to be diverted
is surplus water, or if not surplus water the riparians injured by such diversion
have consented thereto, the department shall . . . issue a permit for the diversion
of such water. .. . The department shall determine and fix the quantity of water
to be diverted and the time such water may be diverted. When it is determined
that a riparian permittee is authorized to withdraw a stated flow of water, he may
use that water on any other land contiguous to his riparian land .... The department shall annually review all permits to divert water . . . . [and] may revoke
any permit upon finding that the withdrawal is detrimental to other riparians or
to the stream or lake . ...
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(5) (West 1973).
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A water master would set prices on water exports, with the price determined in part by the cost of administration and transportation. 21 Federal
programs which provide water at low rates to selected beneficiary groups have
been criticized for engendering highly inefficient uses of water and mismanagement of water resources.21 3 Allowing states to contract with each other to
allocate water supplies would serve to impose a greater awareness of the true
economic value of water and would promote the development of more
sophisticated pricing mechanisms.
By pricing water at its true value, the exporting state would be given an
incentive to use best available water conservation and management methods
so as to maximize the availability of water for export and maximize the value
and sufficiency of the water which it retains for intrastate use. The same conservation incentive would accrue to the importing state since it is entitled to
a limited contractual allotment of water and the importeo water would be
more expensive to procure than local water supplies or water provided by
federally-funded projects.
In fashioning legal policy to govern the interstate shipment of water, sound
economic principles should be applied so that the costs of diverting and
21
transporting water are equitably divided between the beneficiary groups.
The exportation of Great Lakes water to nonriparian states is a consumptive
use and represents a loss of water to the Great Lakes Basin; hence it involves
a redistribution both of water and of the inherent benefits of the water from
Great Lakes user interests to consumer interests in other states.215 The determination of the economic value of the water to those consumer interests would
require a study of all consumptive uses and a corresponding evaluation of
the cost/benefit ratio which accrues to each particular type of use." 6 Such
a study will be a necessary prerequisite to establishing pricing policy for interstate water transport. When water is exchanged between states for a price,
the revenue generated for the exporting state may be used as a fund for
upgrading its water facilities so as to mitigate any resource depletion incurred
21 7
as a result of the exportation.

212. This raises the issue of whether the economic use value of Great Lakes water at locations
in nonriparian states will support the cost of its procurement and transportation.
213. See Water Resources Policy Issues: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Water Resources
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 403
(1981) (testimony of Rose McCullough, Sierra Club).
214. Federal water programs generally provide water free or well below market price to a
chosen constituency. See id. at 405. For example, a primary criticism of the Reclamation Act
is the fact that 12 million acres of valuable cropland were developed in western states at the
cost of displacing agricultural production in eastern states. Id. at 341 (Statement of Rose
McCullough). The western states received this benefit virtually free of charge and eastern states
were not compensated for their losses.
215. INTERNATIoNAL JoINT CommcssIoN, supra note 1, at 9-7.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 206.
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Allowing states to contract among themselves for allocation of water
resources creates a system wherein the benefits and burdens which accrue to
each state are explicitly bargained for among the affected states. This feature
of regional cooperation addresses a major concern of riparian states in regard
to apportionment of water. Each riparian state has the legal right to have
its interests represented in allocation decisions and must be consulted before
any major diversion or exportation of water occurs."1 8
CONCLUSION

In the Great Lakes region, a history of expansion in the law has granted
usufructuary rights to a growing constituency of Great Lakes water users and
has changed the nature and structure of the forum which governs the use
of that water. The riparian doctrine became an intolerable impediment to
municipal and industrial growth in the Great Lakes Basin since nonriparian
parties did not have sufficient access to water and because litigation was not
a successful method for resolving the claims of a multitude of parties to the
use of water in a given waterbody.
In a number of Great Lakes jurisdictions, state permit systems have been
instituted to make water more readily available to a wider public constituency.
These permit systems administer a "hybrid" water law doctrine which provides water for a wide variety of beneficial uses regardless of the place of
use. As a result of centralized inventory control and a prioritized system of
allocation for beneficial uses, public water rights are governed in a centralized and flexible forum within each state.
If a legitimate, or legally cognizable, demand for exportation of Great Lakes
water to nonriparian states does materialize, problems similar to those encountered on the intrastate level will frustrate any attempt to allocate water
equitably on an interstate scale. Since the federal common law is likely to
favor interstate allocation of water under certain circumstances, riparian states
should not expect to be successful in legal efforts to enjoin exportation of
Great Lakes water to points outside the Basin. That is to say that riparian
states will not effectively solve usufructuary disputes through the application
of the doctrine of equitable apportionment in Supreme Court adjudication
under such conditions.
As the Great Lakes become legally recognized as a national water resource,
a specialized forum will be needed to allocate water and to mediate disputes
arising from interstate sales of usufructuary rights and the resulting transcontinental diversions of Great Lakes water. The author advocates the establishment of a regional requisitionary forum, containing those basic features outlined in this N4ote. Such a forum will be of great utility to the riparian states

218. See supra note 15. The province of Ontario would also need to be consulted by the members
of such a forum.
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when the demand for expanded public access to Great Lakes water becomes
acute. The main benefit of the forum would be to enable riparian states to
retain an adequate degree of control, as a community of states, over water
exportation and to enable the riparian states to protect the integrity of the
natural geographic features of the Great Lakes Basin.
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